Time to end delusions about Russia

I have just returned from the forty-seventh Young Königswinter Conference, held at the Europäische Akademie Berlin. The aim of the conference is to bring together young professionals from both Britain and Germany in order to discuss issues and challenges common to both societies and the European Union. The theme of this year’s conference was: ‘How can we Europeans survive, succeed and shape the world?’ This is an area needing far greater concentration, and Königswinter’s organisers were correct to address it.

The conference was held under the Chatham House rule. This means that I am forbidden from disclosing the names of the people who discussed particular issues; I am, however, allowed to unveil what was said. Recurring issues and themes included economic competitiveness, internal cohesion, energy security, and foreign and security policy, which were discussed by both the panels and the participants. In the latter three areas, Russia was mentioned more than once. This is unsurprising given that Russia is by far the largest country in the European Neighbourhood, and one, which, under the iron leadership of Vladimir Putin, has moved in an increasingly un-European direction in recent years.

As Theo Sommer, writing in The German Times points out:

Certainly, there are several disconcerting factors. The interruption of gas supplies to Ukraine, the pressure on Belarus for partial ownership of the gas pipelines; and the economic blockade imposed on Georgia have given rise to serious concern. So have the cyber-attacks on Estonia after the relocation of the Soviet war memorial in Tallinn; the blackmailing of Shell and BP to give up their majority in the Sakhalin II project; the embargo on Polish meat deliveries; the preposterous threats against Poland and the Czech Republic because of the US missile shield to be installed in these two countries; the refusal to hand over the main suspect in the Litvinenko murder case; the suspension of the treaty governing the reduction of conventional forces in Europe; the production of a new generation of intercontinental missiles; the stubborn rejection of the Ahtisaari plan for granting Kosovo independence from Serbia, and the sly maneuvers blocking Europe’s plans for gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia which would bypass Russian territory.

One could also add to this list of concerns the rot of constitutional democracy in Russia, as well as a number of ugly political murders, such as the gunning-down of Anna Politkovskaja. The country’s recent annexing of a chunk of the seabed near the North Pole, while at one level comical, is also a reminder of its newfound strength. For those uneasy with Russian designs, it is likely that Moscow will demand more and more from the rest of the world in the years ahead, particularly if it is left unchecked.

In light of these developments, perhaps our hopes after the collapse of the iron curtain in the late 1980s were too naïve. Delusions continue to this day: Some postulate that Russia will one day join Europe, while others suggest that the country’s behaviour is just a passing fad. Both of these ideas are mistaken. Russia is too big, unstable and autocratic to become a European country, and its wild ad truculent behaviour seems to be more than a momentary drift. Other people blame Europe or America, stating that they have antagonised the Kremlin with European expansion, NATO ‘encirclement’ and missile defence installations. The only reply can be: So what? A declining power must learn to accept its newfound place in the world. Even the ancient Greeks knew that.

But as energy revenues have filled Moscow’s coffers, it has begun to act aggressively again. This has led a plethora of commentators and newspapers in Europe and America to ask if the Cold War is back. Let us be clear here: The Cold War, at least with Russia, ended a long time ago. Modern Russia is a far cry from the Soviet superpower, even in its latter years of stagnation and decline. Modern Russia has an economy no bigger than Paris and London combined, and a population that is set to plunge by 700,000 people per year for the next forty. Its influence in surrounding countries has been pushed back and reduced by the enlargement of the European Union and the creation of the European Neighbourhood. Its sway in the Balkans has been in steady decline throughout the 1990s; the eventual independence of Kosovo will prove its ignominy. And the Russian military withered in the 1990s to such an extent that soldiers were encouraged to take second jobs to pay their way. Nevertheless, Russia remains a considerable power, and we Europeans must deal with the country in a pointed and decisive fashion, casting delusions and wishful thinking aside along the way. This is particularly relevant given reports in International Fleet Review about the Kremlin’s recent proposal to begin a massive naval rearmament programme, structured around the acquisition of five or six 50,000 tonne aircraft carriers. This is an alarming development, which threatens very much to upset the balance of power in Europe, and perhaps also even at a global level.

Aircraft carriers, above even nuclear warheads, are the prerequisite of great power status. They allow a country to construct an outer perimeter of defence, and provide an umbrella potentially impervious to aerial attack. They also produce mobile aerodromes, ready and waiting to be sent to any corner of the Earth in order to produce strategic and tactical impact. From the Second World War, the Falklands War and on to the fronts opened against Islamist terrorism, aircraft carriers have proved crucial. Yet while this unique capability is necessary for any form of extensive military intervention or engagement, aircraft carriers serve possibly an even greater purpose. They allow a country to entrench an aura of power in foreign lands, thereby crystallising power into lasting authority. An aircraft carrier entering a port or harbour is an impressive sight; such spectacles emphasise the power of the possessing society, and the potential devastation it can unleash. This can be multiplied even further if an aircraft carrier is stationed offshore, providing either a decidedly threatening presence for enemies, or a pole of stability for beleaguered allies. These huge vessels are quite simply the most comprehensive, effective and destructive war machines ever built.

Thankfully, much like nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers are not cheap. Costing up to €3 billion per ship, only the strongest countries in the world can afford them. Thus the United States, United Kingdom and France are the only countries to operate extensive carrier fleets today, although Italy, Spain, India and Thailand have also limited aircraft carrier capabilities. Russia and Brazil each hold one vintage aircraft carrier too. But Russia’s acquisition of a new fleet of aircraft carriers will dramatically change the status-quo. While all the major Member States of the European Union—Britain, France, Spain and Italy—have underway large new aircraft carrier programmes, Russia’s plans are more extensive. Together, Russia’s five or six carriers could reach 300,000 tonnes, bringing Russia up to parity with Europe’s combined navies. For the first time in history, the Russian fleet could outgun Britain or France’s, casting the balance of power on the continent away from Europe and decidedly in Moscow’s favour.

It is often forgotten that armaments have impact far greater than only warfare. Military capital also translates into political impact. For example, armed with such a formidable capability, how will Russian designs sway the countries in the European Neighbourhood? We have seen just how ruthless the Kremlin has been with weaker countries like Ukraine and Georgia in the past few years, but how far will it be prepared to pressurise those societies with a fleet of large aircraft carriers, equipped with fighter-bombers capable of flying to most destinations on the European continent? Not for one moment should we imply that Russia and Europe are heading for war, but rather, how will the changing balance of power alter Europe’s perception of Russia? Will Europeans be more reluctant to hinder Russian designs, or involve themselves in countries decreed by the Kremlin to be in Russia’s sphere of influence? It certainly is a possibility, and one that would further undermine Europe’s global standing—after all, Russia is a country of 140 million people, whereas we are a continental Union with a population of almost half a billion. Moreover, how will Member States in the littoral regions of the eastern half of the European Union react? Poland and the Baltic states know only too well the callousness of Russian power, and the European Union needs to be ready to not only protect them from direct attack, but also to appreciate their fears, and act to calm them. As such, Russia’s rearmament has implications for the emerging strategic doctrine of the European Union—perhaps even European integration itself.

We must therefore watch Russian arms programmes closely, and ensure that we take the necessary action to redress any strategic disparity. Britain and France’s acquisition of three massive new carriers between them may not be enough. European defence spending needs to be increased, and spent more wisely. Here, Germany, Spain and Italy can and should do more to assist. Berlin, above all, needs to end conscription in Germany and divert funds into power projection equipment for the Bundeswehr. There is no reason why there should not be two large German aircraft carriers, which should be put to service defending and extending the interests of the European Union. Spain and Italy, spending a lousy percentage of their economies on their armed forces, can and should do more too. Britain and France should not alone pay the cost of defending Europe and providing it with the tools needed to proactively shape the world. Indeed, European integration in areas related to security and defence cannot remain a touchy subject to be swept under the carpet. It is an essential dimension of peace and security in Europe, and only the European Union will have the aggregate power to speak as an equal to the other great powers of tomorrow—some of which will probably be more aggressive than those in the past, particularly if resources dwindle and alliances weaken.