France is back!

Yesterday, Nicolas Sarkozy made his first speech on foreign policy since becoming the president of France. Taking a far more assertive approach than the lame and enfeebled stance of his predecessor, Jacques Chirac, M. Sarkozy’s ideas were certainly robust. For a long while French foreign policy under M. Chirac has tended towards ‘quietism’, anti-Americanism, and even blew hot-and-cold towards London. M. Chirac was the most outspoken critic of the war in Iraq, but much of this was undoubtedly hollow posturing instead of symbolising any principled stance.

But like the last French leader, Nicolas Sarkozy maintained in his speech that the Iraq war was a profound mistake. While this—perhaps accurate—view has not changed in France, Paris seems to now want a new strategy towards Iraq. The French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, a self-proclaimed interventionist and former director of Medecins Sans Frontieres, visited Iraq last week on a fact-finding mission to see if France could offer any assistance to the Iraqi people, who suffer almost constant terrorist attacks from Islamists, bandits and other murderous criminals. It is clear that the fully legitimate and democratically elected Iraqi government remains in a perilous position, and is maintained by the power of the United States. In order to defeat the criminals seeking to undermine Baghdad’s authority and threaten European and American security, this government must be enhanced, empowered and sustained. As such, it is right for France to offer support to Iraq, even if it maintains that the war was itself a mistake. French help in Iraq could undoubtedly assist with stabilising the chaotic country after the initial success of the American and British invasion in March 2003.

But Iraq was certainly not the most interesting or significant dimension of M. Sarkozy’s speech. First, he said that Iran must end its suspected nuclear weapons programmes and co-operate fully with the European Union and the United States. He also stated that a nuclear Iran was ‘unacceptable’ to Paris, and that Iranian non-compliance could result in airstrikes and bombings. This was described by François Heisbourg, an adviser to the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research, as a sea-change in the French attitude towards Tehran. As he argued: ‘This came out of the blue...To actually say that if diplomacy fails the choice will be to accept a nuclear Iran or bomb Iran, this is a diplomatic blockbuster.’ However, the president offered no further information as to whether France would explicitly endorse or assist in an attack should Iranian intransigence continue under the unruly regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Second, in Afghanistan, M. Sarkozy promised to beef-up the French military contingent. The Ministry of Defence today promised a further 150 troops, though like all French forces out on the Afghan frontier, they will not be allowed to join their other European comrades (Britons, Dutch and Danes), the Americans, and the Canadians, in any active warfighting. This is a problematic situation, for the application of France’s considerable military might could do much to help further degrade and crush the Taleban.

Third, M. Sarkozy took a far firmer line with China and Russia. He correctly identified that ‘Russia is imposing its return on the world scene by using its assets, notably oil and gas, with a certain brutality.’ He also said that powerful countries ‘should not be brutal.’ This is clearly a departure from the days of M. Chirac, who seemed to actively enjoy spending time with Russia’s authoritarian leader, Vladimir Putin. As for China, M. Sarkozy said that he thought Beijing should address its currency, which makes its exports too cheap, damaging the world trading system.

Fourth, regarding the United Nations, M. Sarkozy said: ‘France demands new permanent members—Germany, Japan, India, Brazil—and fair representation for Africa.’ He is right. We should support the extension of the United Nations Security Council’s permanent members, especially if they are conducive to European and Western attitudes, as are all countries mentioned previously. The United States should also support Germany, Japan, India and Brazil’s membership of the Security Council, not least because of the potential formation of a new alliance between India, Japan, America and Europe might help us to contain any aggressive and destabilising designs of China and Russia. Nonetheless, it is mandatory that countries like Japan and Germany unshackle themselves from their historical pasts if they are to assume ‘great power’ status. Both must raise defence spending, and build armed forces able to project power if not for their own sake, then certainly to support United Nations-backed peace support missions.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new French president said that France must take a more active role in encouraging other European Union Member States to help Britain and France make the European Union a credible and effective global power. As he put it: ‘Europe must progressively affirm itself as a first-rank player for peace and security, in co-operation with the United Nations, the Atlantic Alliance and the African Union.’ He said that European integration would remain at the heart of French policy, and that Europe is stronger with active French participation, which in turn is good for France. While the French president’s proposals were sketchy, he suggested that Europeans needed to strengthen and integrate their armed forces and power projection capabilities, and that they must come to see threats to their security through the same lens. This tallies with statements made by David Miliband, appointed British foreign minister by the new prime minister, Gordon Brown, last month, who said that making the European Union a stronger power in the world was now one of the Foreign Office’s three primary missions. Hopefully, Anglo-French relations under Mr. Brown and M. Sarkozy, and Mr. Miliband and M. Kouchner, will be more inspiring and productive than under their predecessors, which at times were unhelpful and riddled with spite and acrimony.

Nicolas Sarkozy also appeared to change his tune on Turkey, saying that he would not block further European Union discussions with Ankara, provided that they did not assume Turkey’s accession was presupposed. This is yet another step in the right direction. While we should be careful of letting Turkey into the European Union prematurely, the possibility should not be altogether ruled out. This could enhance the Islamist movement in the country, which may provoke the Turkish armed forces into domestic intervention.

In all, the new French president’s speech presents a far more active and constructive role for France in both the European Union and on the world scene. This is a clear departure from the lost years of Jacques Chirac. It also offers potential for closer Anglo-French relations, which are critical if the vision of a strong, credible and capable European Union is to be realised. France is back! Britain—and other European Union Member States—should seize the opportunity and work with it.

New destroyers enhance European navies

In recent years, many European navies have undergone quiet but nonetheless impressive enhancements. A number of imposing new aircraft carriers, landing platforms, warships and submarines have been introduced, particularly in the Royal Navy, the French Marine Nationale, Italy’s Marina Militare, the Deutsche Marine, the Armada Española, and the Koninklijke Marine of the Netherlands. These vessels of war hold some of the most lethal and advanced naval weaponry and radar equipment in the world—on par or exceeding that of even the United States Navy; some ships have even left American observers ‘shaken and shocked’. In fact, so many new classes have been recently completed, laid down, and ordered, that it would be inappropriate to deal with all of them all at once. In this entry, therefore, we shall deal with what are perhaps the most stunning two classes of warship, the Type 45 ‘Daring’ class and the Horizon class—both potent destroyers—which will enter service with the British, French and Italian navies in the next few years.

Destroyers are one of the most important types of warship in any modern fleet, particularly those equipped with far larger vessels whose role is to project force over extensive distances. As a class of vessel in its own right, the first destroyer was developed by Fernando Villaamil, a Spanish naval officer and engineer, as a defence against the newly emerging threat from torpedo boats to pre-Dreadnought battleships in the early 1880s. His design was laid down in 1886, and commissioned into the Spanish fleet a year later. Called Destructor, the new gunboat had a displacement of a mere 315 tonnes, was armed with a just a handful of cannon and five torpedo tubes, but had a speed of approximately twenty-two knots, which gave it sufficient thrust to hunt down the new torpedo boats. Built in British shipyards, the vessel’s design was studied closely by the Admiralty in London, and later influenced the first generations of British destroyers—like HMS Havock, entering service in 1894. Against the role of these early destroyers, the modern destroyer’s role is to provide an aerial umbrella to defend larger ships against enemy attack by warplanes and anti-ship missiles. The Falklands War, the first naval conflict of the missile age, showed just how advanced anti-ship missiles had become by the early 1980s, and the French-designed Exocet missile proved to be a lethal threat to even the most advanced British vessels. HMS Sheffield, then a modern Type 42 destroyer, was struck by such a warhead with a considerable loss of life. Some of the lessons learned were implemented in the second half of the 1980s, although many countries already had large fleets of destroyers designed and built in the 1970s.

The Type 45 and Horizon destroyers were conceived in the late 1980s under the pretext of the NFR-90 (New Frigate for the 1990s) programme. This project included seven countries, and aimed to develop a new generation of air-defence warship; however, differing needs led the United States and United Kingdom to pull out of the programme, which subsequently faltered. Britain, France and Italy then went ahead to begin the Horizon Common Generation Frigate project in 1992, but London eventually withdrew—again citing different requirements—and went its own way. While Britain wanted ‘go-anywhere’ vessels, capable of producing a defensive ‘bubble’ over entire fleets, France did not need such a requirement due to the projected capacity of its new aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle. Further, Italy’s navy, still operating primarily under air cover provided by the Italian airforce in the Mediterranean Sea, did not want such expensive and powerful ships either. Britain went ahead on its own, and began developing the Type 45 in 1999.

Both classes of ship, however, would eventually come to use similar or identical radar and weapons systems, centred around the ‘phenomenal’ Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS), which utilises SAMPSON radar in the Type 45’s case, and EMPAR in the case of the Horizon. PAAMS also uses the ASTER surface-to-air missiles, which when combined with SAMPSON or EMPAR, provides an almost impervious aerial defence system, capable of protecting large fleets of vessels. Indeed, so advanced is PAAMS that it can detect and track almost every single flying object the size of a grapefruit over a radius of several-hundred kilometres. At any moment, it can fire multiple salvoes of missiles to knock numerous targets out of the sky within a radius of one hundred kilometres from the ship. So capable will the new ships be that just one of the new vessels will be more powerful than the entire current fleet of the Royal Navy’s Type 42 destroyers. Revealingly, as one of the Royal Navy’s Lieutenant-Commanders, Phil Harper, says, referring to each ship’s forty-eight ASTER missiles: ‘It doesn't sound much, but by the time you have used them up most air forces are dead.’

Type 45 ‘Daring’ class: The Type 45 has a displacement of 7,350 tonnes, which makes it heavier than some types of World War II cruiser. Each vessel is 154.4 metres long, 21.2 metres wide and has a draught of 5 metres. Yet its stealth shielding means that its radar signature is comparable to a fishing boat. Powered by Integrated Electric Propulsion—the first system of its kind in the world—the vessels can ‘comfortably’ reach speeds of over thirty knots, and have a range of 13,000 kilometres. With PAAMS and armed with forty-eight ASTER missiles, a 114 millimetre long-range naval gun, and Phalanx close-in weapons systems, the ‘Daring class’, according to the former First Sea Lord, Sir Alan West, will ‘be the Royal Navy’s most capable destroyer ever, and will enter service later this decade as the best air defence ship in the world.’ Indeed, these weapons systems will be further enhanced with heavy machine-guns, decoys, and a Lynx attack helicopter or Merlin support helicopter. While primarily designed to defend the two massive new British aircraft carriers, due to come into service in 2014 and 2016 respectively, the Type 45s are also capable of multi-purpose use and are deployable anywhere in the world. Eight Type 45s are planned for construction, with the first, HMS Daring, already under sea trials. The other five vessels of the first batch—costing £6 billion (€8.8 billion)—are to be named HMS Dauntless, HMS Diamond, HMS Dragon, HMS Defender and HMS Duncan.

As BAe Systems puts it, which designed and is building the vessels:

The Type 45 anti-air warfare destroyers will provide the backbone of the Royal Navy’s air defences for much of the first half of the twenty-first century. They will be able to engage a large number of targets simultaneously and defend aircraft carriers or groups of ships, such as an amphibious landing force, against the strongest future threats from the air. A versatile warship, the Type 45 will provide unprecedented detection and defensive capability and vastly improved living standards when the first of class, [HMS] Daring, enters service in 2009. They will be capable of contributing to worldwide maritime and joint operations in multi-threat environments, providing a specialist air-warfare capability.

Horizon class: Like the Type 45, the Horizon class of destroyer will also be a state-of-the-art naval platform. While its EMPAR radar system will have lesser range than SAMPSON, its effect within the covered area will be comparably lethal for any aerial object attempting hostile penetration of the warship’s defensive perimeter. Four ships—costing €3 billion (£2.3 billion)—of the Horizon class are due to be completed: France has named its two vessels Forbin and Chevalier Paul, while Italy’s are to be called Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio. Three ships have so far been launched, and are undergoing sea trials. Each ship will displace 5,600 tonnes; each has a length of 152.8 metres, a width of 20.3 metres and a draught of 5.4 metres. Equipped with two gas turbines, the Horizons will be able to cruise at a maximum speed of twenty-nine knots, while having a range of 13,000 kilometres if cruising at eighteen knots. French ships will be equipped with two 76 millimetre general purpose naval guns and eight Exocet missile launchers, while their Italian counterparts will be have one more naval gun and TESEO missile launchers. As with the Type 45s, the Italian and French variants will have decoys, close-in weapons systems and torpedo launchers. The Horizon class will also carry either a NH90 or EH101 attack helicopter for surface-to-air and anti-submarine warfare.

What is clear is that these two formidable new warship classes are a step-change in European naval capabilities. With a combined total of twelve destroyers, they provide more than sufficient and future-proof air defence for any European naval expeditionary force. Only the United States Navy’s future Zumwalt class of heavy destroyer will match them but these projected vessels are primed for land attack rather than aerial defence. This is one area where the European destroyers are less capable. The Type 45s may need to be re-calibrated if necessary so that they can fire cruise missiles, thereby enhancing their land attack capacity. This should not, however, be a problem, for their vertical missile launchers are capable of this task with some adaptations. The Horizon class may also need similar adaptation, although the Marine Nationale is rumoured to have planned to equip its ships with modified Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

What, however, can be learnt from the Type 45 and Horizon projects? More than might at first be thought. First, instead of several projects, it would be more cost effective and efficient if European navies collaborated more closely in designing integrated naval platforms. The potential economies of scale and technological expertise obtainable may in some cases dramatically enhance the development times and costs of large naval programmes. Second, as European navies operate progressively more closely under the European Security and Defence Policy, it is essential that interoperability be enhanced. Standardised naval and military equipment, that is to say the same warships, fighter-bombers and missiles being used by all European Union Member States, instead of numerous national projects, is clearly the way forward. Third, the larger the project—and naval programmes are often the most extensive in terms of research and development—the more effective and potent the European defence-industrial base will be. Finally, the lower the cost and the greater the efficiency means, at least potentially, that more warships can be acquired and maintained. With Russia, China and many other Asian navies arming themselves quite rapidly with growing fleets of frigates and corvettes, strong European naval forces are necessary to sustain the West’s aura of power, while also keeping the sealanes open and our trade routes secure.

Towards a New ‘New Imperialism’?

The late nineteenth century was the high age of empire. European explorers, sailors, missionaries, traders and industrialists were spreading out across the globe, claiming almost anything and everything they could in the name of their respective countries. The British and French empires grew so vast that they ruled almost half of the world between them, while Europe vibrated with wealth, confidence and power like no continent had ever done so before. Indeed, there seemed no limits to what was possible. As Cecil John Rhodes said, during the ‘Scramble for Africa’, in the closing years of the Victorian age:

The world is nearly all parcelled out, and what there is left of it is being divided up, conquered and colonised. To think of these stars that you see overhead at night, these vast worlds which we can never reach. I would annex the planets if I could; I often think of that. It makes me so sad to see them so clear and yet so far.

Mr. Rhodes—who later gave much of his great fortune, made in the diamond mines of British South Africa, to found the Rhodes Scholarships at the University of Oxford—above all others defined his time. Aggressive, optimistic and confident, his personal mission was to extend the frontiers of his nation’s empire over all territories not yet under European imperial jurisdiction. He was even rumoured to have wanted to reassert London’s authority over the United States! Unfortunately for this great empire-builder, dreams of annexing other planets in other star systems were far beyond the reach of even the most arrogant of Victorians. But should he have looked closer to home, he might have noticed huge expanses of territory ripe for British colonisation on the North and South Poles. Granted, much of the land and ice is inhospitable for Europeans. Accepted, there was little of any real value on either Pole, especially for a late nineteenth century Victorian. But just as humans may one day spread out from Earth and colonise other planets, Mr. Rhodes should have also realised that there might be something worth having on the North and South Poles.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin certainly thinks so. Reminiscent of times past, when intrepid explorers turned up on foreign shores and claimed all the land in the name of ‘His Majesty’, it was almost comical watching a dingy Russian submarine plant a little Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed in early August. This move, reinforcing moves made by the Kremlin in 2001 to extend its maritime borders to adjacent continental shelves, raised the hackles of other countries with boundaries on the Arctic Circle. As Canada’s foreign minister, Peter MacKay, put it: ‘This isn't the fifteenth century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say: “We’re claiming this territory”.’ Well, actually—and this will come as news for a country like Canada, which has, for so long, sheltered under the security umbrella of the United States—you most certainly can. A large country bristling with nuclear missiles, and ruled by an increasingly aggressive and unpredictable elite, can in the end do whatever it likes, so long as other powers do not put up sufficient resistance. While other powers, not least the United States and European Union, can apply severe economic and diplomatic pressure, it may be succinctly difficult to dislodge the Russians from any claimed territory—particularly when that is thought to contain abundant supplies of oil and gas, which the Russians understand to provide them with new levers of political influence.

The world may, therefore, be about to enter a New ‘New Imperialism’. Whereas in the second half of the Victorian era European powers scrambled for Africa, today they may be set on a scramble for the North and South Poles—and any other unclaimed areas rich with natural resources. In light of Russia’s actions, Denmark, Canada and the United States have also raised claims to parts of the Arctic, some of which conflict with the Kremlin’s claims. Here, it is clear that we—the whole of the European Union—must throw our collective weight behind Denmark, especially if the Danish claim can provide us with potentially abundant maritime or territorial regions rich in oil and gas. Denmark has sent research teams to ascertain whether or not the Lomonosov Ridge is attached to Greenland (a Danish territory administered by Copenhagen). Other European Union Member States should provide all that is necessary in order to support the Danish team, whether this be geological expertise or complex undersea equipment. Their success could hold a number of implications, not least related to the security of our energy supply.

Energy security is a pressing pan-European issue at the moment, and we must diversify our supplies using whatever means we can. Environmentalists may argue that the North and South Poles should be left as pristine wildernesses, and they would in an ideal world be right. The Antarctic is at least protected by the Antarctic Treaty System, signed by all the major powers, including the European Union’s Member States, the United States and Russia. The North Pole, however, is covered by no similar treaty. Here, we face the worst of two evils. We can either claim as much of the regions rich in raw materials as possible, or leave them to their fate under countries like Russia. Should sensitive ecosystems be under our administration, we can ensure that high standards are maintained to protect them; if they are left to Russia, we have no such control. And it needs not be pointed out that Russia’s environmental record over the past few decades has been far from impressive. In fact, few countries can hold a worse record: From the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe of 1986 and the atomic detonations conducted by the Soviet regime in the Northern reaches of the country during the 1960s, to the massive pollution caused by wasteful Soviet industry and the vast tracts of forest turned into wasteland by acid rain, Russia’s environmental destruction is unsurpassed. No indeed, simply leaving the North Pole to the Kremlin is not an option.

So there are three elements in Europe’s favour, which make it right for us to lay claim to unclaimed or partly claimed territories and maritime regions, particularly on our northern borders. First, we must ensure that others do not claim wildernesses to undermine our global power and authority; if they do, we must act as one through the European Union to rebuff their claims. Second, we must ensure that we have direct access to regions rich in energy supplies and in other strategic raw materials, or we may become heavily reliant on foreigners for essential supplies. Third, the protection of the environment will be more successful under Europeans’ watch than under anyone else’s; we have high environmental standards, others don’t.

Yet there is a final element to this Arctic saga, which concerns our pro-activeness: Why did we allow Russia to claim half of the North Pole in the first place? We must be more assertive. We cannot allow others to beat us to new resources or to stake out new spheres of influence. It is mandatory that we stay ahead of the game and do not fall from our position at the top of the world system. This is one area where Cecil Rhodes cannot be faulted. He understood the importance of assertiveness and power. His successors did not, and their political and economic power suffered as a result. It is easy to think that we live in different times, and that ‘power politics’ is a thing of the past. The actions of countries like Russia—and China in Africa—would suggest otherwise. We ignore these realities at our peril.

Exemplary words from Theodore Roosevelt

That the European Union is seen very favourably in many countries, particularly those in the European Neighbourhood, increases our moral authority in the wider world. To be loved is a good thing. But at the same time, as Machiavelli warned, to be loved is not enough. Lasting order and a durable peace are not built only through love. They are also constructed through power, authority and respect. As such, the European Union must also be feared. Other countries must realise that there might be considerable consequences should they fail to meet European preferences and requests—and that misbehaviour will not go unpunished. As the former United States president, Theodore Roosevelt, told his people in the early twentieth century, when the United States was itself emerging as a major industrial and economic power:

There is a homely adage which runs: “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” If the American nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far.

These words apply as much to the contemporary European Union as they do to America in the Edwardian era. We might rephrase Roosevelt’s citation a little, making it directly relevant to us:

There is a homely adage which runs: “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” If the European Union will speak softly and yet build up and sustain its battlegroups and institutionalise its security strategy, the European Neighbourhood will prosper and European security will grow.

At the same time, we Europeans must constitute a distinct geopolitical zone in the form of the European Neighbourhood in which we are the exclusive and legitimate authority. The Americans did something similar in 1823 when President James Monroe crafted the ‘Monroe Doctrine’, which declared that:

The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers...We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt provided a ‘corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine by offering an appropriate strategy for influencing such a zone. As he put it in May 1904:

All that this country desires is to see the neighbouring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may...ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

By substituting the ‘United States’ for the ‘European Union’, and ‘Western Hemisphere’ for ‘European Neighbourhood’, Roosevelt’s words could apply just as directly to us. The European Union must proclaim itself the sole and legitimate ‘police power’ in all regions surrounding our territorial and maritime boundaries. These spaces include the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Russia, Central Asia, North and Central Africa and parts of the Middle East. It is precisely these geopolitical areas that are of the greatest importance to our security, prosperity and cohesion. Keeping order in these regions by promoting constitutional government, justice and the rule of law—the ties of civilised society—is in our direct interest, and will accordingly build a progressively domesticated zone of security and prosperity around the European Union.

Time to end delusions about Russia

I have just returned from the forty-seventh Young Königswinter Conference, held at the Europäische Akademie Berlin. The aim of the conference is to bring together young professionals from both Britain and Germany in order to discuss issues and challenges common to both societies and the European Union. The theme of this year’s conference was: ‘How can we Europeans survive, succeed and shape the world?’ This is an area needing far greater concentration, and Königswinter’s organisers were correct to address it.

The conference was held under the Chatham House rule. This means that I am forbidden from disclosing the names of the people who discussed particular issues; I am, however, allowed to unveil what was said. Recurring issues and themes included economic competitiveness, internal cohesion, energy security, and foreign and security policy, which were discussed by both the panels and the participants. In the latter three areas, Russia was mentioned more than once. This is unsurprising given that Russia is by far the largest country in the European Neighbourhood, and one, which, under the iron leadership of Vladimir Putin, has moved in an increasingly un-European direction in recent years.

As Theo Sommer, writing in The German Times points out:

Certainly, there are several disconcerting factors. The interruption of gas supplies to Ukraine, the pressure on Belarus for partial ownership of the gas pipelines; and the economic blockade imposed on Georgia have given rise to serious concern. So have the cyber-attacks on Estonia after the relocation of the Soviet war memorial in Tallinn; the blackmailing of Shell and BP to give up their majority in the Sakhalin II project; the embargo on Polish meat deliveries; the preposterous threats against Poland and the Czech Republic because of the US missile shield to be installed in these two countries; the refusal to hand over the main suspect in the Litvinenko murder case; the suspension of the treaty governing the reduction of conventional forces in Europe; the production of a new generation of intercontinental missiles; the stubborn rejection of the Ahtisaari plan for granting Kosovo independence from Serbia, and the sly maneuvers blocking Europe’s plans for gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia which would bypass Russian territory.

One could also add to this list of concerns the rot of constitutional democracy in Russia, as well as a number of ugly political murders, such as the gunning-down of Anna Politkovskaja. The country’s recent annexing of a chunk of the seabed near the North Pole, while at one level comical, is also a reminder of its newfound strength. For those uneasy with Russian designs, it is likely that Moscow will demand more and more from the rest of the world in the years ahead, particularly if it is left unchecked.

In light of these developments, perhaps our hopes after the collapse of the iron curtain in the late 1980s were too naïve. Delusions continue to this day: Some postulate that Russia will one day join Europe, while others suggest that the country’s behaviour is just a passing fad. Both of these ideas are mistaken. Russia is too big, unstable and autocratic to become a European country, and its wild ad truculent behaviour seems to be more than a momentary drift. Other people blame Europe or America, stating that they have antagonised the Kremlin with European expansion, NATO ‘encirclement’ and missile defence installations. The only reply can be: So what? A declining power must learn to accept its newfound place in the world. Even the ancient Greeks knew that.

But as energy revenues have filled Moscow’s coffers, it has begun to act aggressively again. This has led a plethora of commentators and newspapers in Europe and America to ask if the Cold War is back. Let us be clear here: The Cold War, at least with Russia, ended a long time ago. Modern Russia is a far cry from the Soviet superpower, even in its latter years of stagnation and decline. Modern Russia has an economy no bigger than Paris and London combined, and a population that is set to plunge by 700,000 people per year for the next forty. Its influence in surrounding countries has been pushed back and reduced by the enlargement of the European Union and the creation of the European Neighbourhood. Its sway in the Balkans has been in steady decline throughout the 1990s; the eventual independence of Kosovo will prove its ignominy. And the Russian military withered in the 1990s to such an extent that soldiers were encouraged to take second jobs to pay their way. Nevertheless, Russia remains a considerable power, and we Europeans must deal with the country in a pointed and decisive fashion, casting delusions and wishful thinking aside along the way. This is particularly relevant given reports in International Fleet Review about the Kremlin’s recent proposal to begin a massive naval rearmament programme, structured around the acquisition of five or six 50,000 tonne aircraft carriers. This is an alarming development, which threatens very much to upset the balance of power in Europe, and perhaps also even at a global level.

Aircraft carriers, above even nuclear warheads, are the prerequisite of great power status. They allow a country to construct an outer perimeter of defence, and provide an umbrella potentially impervious to aerial attack. They also produce mobile aerodromes, ready and waiting to be sent to any corner of the Earth in order to produce strategic and tactical impact. From the Second World War, the Falklands War and on to the fronts opened against Islamist terrorism, aircraft carriers have proved crucial. Yet while this unique capability is necessary for any form of extensive military intervention or engagement, aircraft carriers serve possibly an even greater purpose. They allow a country to entrench an aura of power in foreign lands, thereby crystallising power into lasting authority. An aircraft carrier entering a port or harbour is an impressive sight; such spectacles emphasise the power of the possessing society, and the potential devastation it can unleash. This can be multiplied even further if an aircraft carrier is stationed offshore, providing either a decidedly threatening presence for enemies, or a pole of stability for beleaguered allies. These huge vessels are quite simply the most comprehensive, effective and destructive war machines ever built.

Thankfully, much like nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers are not cheap. Costing up to €3 billion per ship, only the strongest countries in the world can afford them. Thus the United States, United Kingdom and France are the only countries to operate extensive carrier fleets today, although Italy, Spain, India and Thailand have also limited aircraft carrier capabilities. Russia and Brazil each hold one vintage aircraft carrier too. But Russia’s acquisition of a new fleet of aircraft carriers will dramatically change the status-quo. While all the major Member States of the European Union—Britain, France, Spain and Italy—have underway large new aircraft carrier programmes, Russia’s plans are more extensive. Together, Russia’s five or six carriers could reach 300,000 tonnes, bringing Russia up to parity with Europe’s combined navies. For the first time in history, the Russian fleet could outgun Britain or France’s, casting the balance of power on the continent away from Europe and decidedly in Moscow’s favour.

It is often forgotten that armaments have impact far greater than only warfare. Military capital also translates into political impact. For example, armed with such a formidable capability, how will Russian designs sway the countries in the European Neighbourhood? We have seen just how ruthless the Kremlin has been with weaker countries like Ukraine and Georgia in the past few years, but how far will it be prepared to pressurise those societies with a fleet of large aircraft carriers, equipped with fighter-bombers capable of flying to most destinations on the European continent? Not for one moment should we imply that Russia and Europe are heading for war, but rather, how will the changing balance of power alter Europe’s perception of Russia? Will Europeans be more reluctant to hinder Russian designs, or involve themselves in countries decreed by the Kremlin to be in Russia’s sphere of influence? It certainly is a possibility, and one that would further undermine Europe’s global standing—after all, Russia is a country of 140 million people, whereas we are a continental Union with a population of almost half a billion. Moreover, how will Member States in the littoral regions of the eastern half of the European Union react? Poland and the Baltic states know only too well the callousness of Russian power, and the European Union needs to be ready to not only protect them from direct attack, but also to appreciate their fears, and act to calm them. As such, Russia’s rearmament has implications for the emerging strategic doctrine of the European Union—perhaps even European integration itself.

We must therefore watch Russian arms programmes closely, and ensure that we take the necessary action to redress any strategic disparity. Britain and France’s acquisition of three massive new carriers between them may not be enough. European defence spending needs to be increased, and spent more wisely. Here, Germany, Spain and Italy can and should do more to assist. Berlin, above all, needs to end conscription in Germany and divert funds into power projection equipment for the Bundeswehr. There is no reason why there should not be two large German aircraft carriers, which should be put to service defending and extending the interests of the European Union. Spain and Italy, spending a lousy percentage of their economies on their armed forces, can and should do more too. Britain and France should not alone pay the cost of defending Europe and providing it with the tools needed to proactively shape the world. Indeed, European integration in areas related to security and defence cannot remain a touchy subject to be swept under the carpet. It is an essential dimension of peace and security in Europe, and only the European Union will have the aggregate power to speak as an equal to the other great powers of tomorrow—some of which will probably be more aggressive than those in the past, particularly if resources dwindle and alliances weaken.

A ‘fifth column’?

On Tuesday, a letter was published in The Times outlining my views on the need for deeper integration in the European Union in areas relating to foreign, security and defence policy. Criticising a previous leader in The Times, I argued that the debate in Britain on the proposed ‘Reform Treaty’ had become narrow-minded and insular, getting increasingly bogged-down in squalid debates on the so-called surrender of sovereignty to Brussels. Rather, I suggested that we—Britons, and other Europeans—needed to look beyond our own shores for once, and note the alarming changes underway in other parts of the world. Some of these, like the re-emergence of a wild and truculent Russia and an expansive China, have the potential to weaken our global power and authority, perhaps also undermining our economic dynamism and social cohesion.

The response in some quarters only proved my point. A commentary by Richard North on ‘EU Referendum’ suggested that my arguments represented the ‘fifth column’, and that my aim was to undermine the British state. According to Mr. North, the ‘Reform Treaty’ meant that Britain would lose its sovereignty, which is apparently ‘like virginity—you either have it or you don’t.’ This is profoundly mistaken. Sovereignty is not absolute. After all, does Mexico have the same sovereignty as the United States? Is not China more sovereign than Mongolia? Isn’t Brazil more sovereign than Suriname? The answer is clear: While most states recognise others as formally ‘sovereign’, in reality sovereignty is relative. Weak countries are always subjected to stronger ones. The economic, cultural and political power of a great power permeates surrounding societies, shaping their political processes and policies, on both a domestic and international level. Imperial power—that is, the control or influence over other countries’ domestic politics and development—did not fade after the end of the European empires, it simply took a number of new forms.

Mr. North then accused me of ‘the “Run to mother Europe” ploy.’ Had he taken greater notice of contemporary European history, he might have realised that Britain joined the European project in 1973, and thus ran to Europe a long time ago. After successfully remaining part of Europe for more than thirty years, British trade in goods and services with the rest of continent has grown to almost sixty percent of Britain’s total. With between a third and a quarter of the world’s wealth, Europe represents a rich, prosperous and stable market, which can only expand even further as economic growth continues in the new Member States. And given that the European Union has been a principal contributor to the peace and security of the continent—along, of course with the security umbrella provided by the United States and NATO—we, in his own words, really were ‘able to ride off into the sunset and live happily ever after.’ War and conflict on European soil are now unthinkable, and probably impossible. The task now is to defend what we have achieved in Europe from the dangerous world beyond our borders.

Therefore, my argument still holds: As China, Russia, India and a number of other regional powers rise in the coming years, Britain’s international power and authority will continue to decline. The United States, with increasing trade and interests in Asia and the Pacific Rim, is unlikely to maintain large military forces in defence of the European Union; and it would be very wrong for Europeans to expect it to do so. Indeed, many American forces have already been redeployed from Britain and Germany to Central Asia and the Middle East. The future will hold only more of the same. And why should Americans defend Europe? Are we not rich enough to defend ourselves? Do we not have the political will to browbeat our enemies into doing our will? Are we unable to stand up for our values and interests with the use of armed force? Europe’s future is bleak if the answer to all of these questions is not a firm ‘yes’. A strong European Union will have the military and political cohesion to work with the United States in order to sustain Western primacy. A weak Europe will distract American concerns, and empower forces hostile to Western civilisation.

So the Europhobes are in no position to lecture pro-Europeans on issues relating to the European Union. Whereas we have the energy and vision necessary to mobilise the European Union’s enormous potential, the Europhobes only want to bring it, and everything it represents—an area of freedom, economic prosperity, human rights, democratic values and a durable peace—crashing down. The Europhobes are the real ‘fifth column’ on our continent; pro-Europeans must prevent anti-Europeans from moving from the margins of politics into the mainstream of political debate.