European militarisation gathers pace under new proposals

European Voice, the European-oriented subsidiary newspaper of The Economist, today reported that Nicolas Sarkozy, the current president of France, had reopened the debate on the need for a greater level of military integration in the European Union. This comes at a time when the French are undertaking a comprehensive defence review, which is nearing completion. This is important, not least because France is, after the United Kingdom, the only other European Union Member State with near comprehensive military forces, backed up by the full plethora of naval and aerial platforms, including nuclear weapons, missile firing submarines, and the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier outside of the United States Navy. Unless France and Britain move together, any issue surrounding European defence is a quite simply a non-starter.

Mr. Sarkozy proposes that a ‘core group’ of the European Union’s strongest military powers be formed once the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified and operational—probably sometime during 2009. This group, he suggests, would include Poland, Spain, Italy and Germany, which would be led by France and the United Kingdom. Its role would be to pioneer the enhancement and integration of the European Union’s twenty-seven (or perhaps twenty-six, given that Denmark has an opt-out from the European Security and Defence Policy) different militaries, which are prone to massive inefficiency and waste. The Member States’ agglomerated defence spending of some €201 billion (£149 billion; $294 billion)—which, bar the United States, is larger than the rest of the world’s defence budgets combined—might finally begin to meet similar economies of scale as the Americans. Currently, there are numerous different national military projects underway, and often these are motivated by regional economic needs instead of a solid commitment to either serious military capability or economic efficiency. This problem is compounded by differing national needs, particularly as the smaller Member States do not have the industrial capacity or financial resources to pay for the same sort of kit as the French and British. Across the European Union, there are presently under construction numerous different tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, helicopters, strike-fighters, destroyers, frigates, assault ships, and aircraft carriers, leading to unnecessary duplication and often poor interoperability.

This, of course, leads to a vicious circle, further complicated by defence inflation, and low levels of military expenditure, particularly in the smaller and medium-sized Member States—and some of the larger ones, not least Spain, Italy and Germany, each spending merely between 1.1% and 1.8% of their Gross Domestic Products on defence. It all adds up to a continuous degrading of European armed forces, which were once the most ruthless, efficient and lethal in the world. And to make matters worse, the reduced state of capability and readiness leads to the derogation of the European defence-industrial base, allowing foreign competitors to gain ground on us almost every year. This is a sorry state of affairs, which further reduces our global power and authority, leading to the wishful thinking and reckless idealism that are often and rightly criticised by the United States. And given the growing disparity between the American armed forces and their European counterparts, Europeans are increasingly less able to contribute anything of real substance to the transatlantic partnership, reducing the effectiveness of NATO, and producing an environment more conducive to American unilateralism.

Much of this was all realised a long time ago, starting during the Gulf War in 1991. The issue was raised again after the subsequent Bosnian and Kosovo wars, culminating in the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan, where many European militaries have found it difficult to integrate with the Americans—or even other Europeans like the British and French. The drive to enhance European military capabilities was in part responsible for the St. Malo Accords between Britain and France in 1998, whose aim was to provide for a greater level of European military autonomy within NATO. While a number of initiatives followed, these have been less successful than initially hoped, not least because of the acrimony and divisions that arose out of Tony Blair and George W. Bush’s decision to remove the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. But with the changes of leadership in London and Paris in 2007, the conditions may now be right for Britain and France to take European defence integration onto a new plane.

This is certainly what Mr. Sarkozy hopes. He has already suggested that his priority under the French presidency of the European Council in the second half of this year will be to drive forward the European Security and Defence Policy. He has called for a redrafting of the European Security Strategy, which was first compiled in 2003 by Robert Cooper and Javier Solana. While an excellent first stab at painting a European strategic doctrine, recent events in Russia and elsewhere demand additional amendments to take on board new strategic realities. The British foreign secretary, David Miliband, is also said to be keen on the idea, and is suspected of sharing the French president’s desires to bolster European militaries. Reports in The Guardian stated that in the initial version of his ‘Europe as a Model Power’ speech in January, Mr. Miliband even went so far as to call for a comprehensive pan-European defence review. This will certainly be needed at some point, especially if Mr. Sarkozy’s ‘core group’ is established next year.

While the measures needed for Europeans to get out of the military doldrums seem abundantly clear, Britain and France have continued to talk past one another. Invoking Shakespeare, Nick Witney, the former head of the European Defence Agency, and currently a senior policy fellow of the European Council on Foreign Relations, eloquently put it like this:

Much Ado about Nothing is the story of Beatrice and Benedick—a couple clearly, to everyone but them, destined for each other. But, each fiercely independent, they waste years talking past each other, mistiming their mutual approaches, indulging in unhelpful flirtations elsewhere, and generally delighting in sticking fingers in each other’s psychological wounds. Sounds familiar? For...[Beatrice and Benedick], it was at last a case of All’s Well that Ends Well. For Britain and France, the drama is not yet played out.

The two sticking points regard the transatlantic relationship and the United States. Britain has long remained strongly attached to NATO, while France has sought to pursue a more Europeanised and autonomous approach. It was hoped that the St. Malo Accords, which tried to merge both perspectives, would get past this problem, yet it still remains. However, a grand bargain can be struck: if Britain commits to full European military autonomy—including an independent military headquarters—France will rejoin NATO’s integrated command structures. At least this is the idea currently being mooted, not least by Mr. Sarkozy’s new administration itself, which will help France cast off Gaullism. Britain should play ball, because a strong and autonomous Europe will enhance the reach and capacity of NATO, particularly as it mounts increasingly sophisticated out-of-area operations.

Indeed, the need of a strong and militarily capable European Union has never been greater. The ongoing rise of China, India and Russia, alongside a myriad of regional powers like Brazil and Iran, means that the power of the European Union’s individual Member States—even Britain and France—is in a steady but relative decline. And London, Paris and Berlin’s influence in Washington has also been reduced. This is due to the growing Asian-Pacific orientation of the United States, but also the widening gulf of power between the two sides of the Atlantic. Fifty years ago, the United States and the United Kingdom were more evenly matched than they are today, while the Cold War kept America deeply interested in European affairs. This is no longer the case.

So the French proposal is a good one, and one that Gordon Brown’s Labour government should support. But British support should not end in mere lip service, or some form of reluctant or indifferent acceptance. Military issues are an area that Britain has the experience, expertise and knowledge to lead with from the front. As a military power, Britain is greatly respected by other Europeans, and has its forces forwardly deployed in over eighty countries. Anglo-French leadership could enable Europeans to protect themselves with their own missile defence system—instead of relying on the Americans—while simultaneously becoming a major intelligence and space power in the twenty-first century. These are certainly the three military platforms Mr. Sarkozy has in mind. Integration in this area would build on current Anglo-French cooperation on a common class of aircraft carrier, which might eventually provide the European Union with the ability to deploy three supercarriers of approximately 75,000 tonnes. Anglo-French leadership could increase European military power in many other areas, from unmanned aeroplane technology to naval and logistical support capacity—there really is no limit.

By leading a ‘core group’, London and Paris may also be able to set an example to those Member States unwilling to pull their weight. Already mentioned are Germany, Italy and Spain’s appallingly low level of defence spending, but they are not the only culprits. Mr. Sarkozy has suggested that all members of the European defence group should be willing to spend at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defence. Only Britain, France, Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria currently spend that amount. All other Member States are way below what is actually a NATO-recommended benchmark. In comparison, the United States spends about 4% of its Gross Domestic Product—which is still far less than Cold War levels of defence spending. And if the big Member States increase their spending, they might also be able to convince—either through pressure or by example—the others to do so too. In any case, European militaries and the defence-industrial base can only gain, which will enhance the security of all of us in an increasingly volatile era.

But Mr. Sarkozy hopes that military integration within the ‘core group’ will ultimately lead to a large and elite European intervention force, able to be deployed anywhere in the world. The creation of this force would propel Europe fully onto the world stage, particularly if Member States’ overseas military bases are ‘Europeanised’. Anglo-French leadership would see the European Union finally coming of age as a global military power, armed with the capacity to enforce its will on foreign countries, providing Europeans with more international clout and authority. It will also enable us to help the United States uphold the global economy, which itself rests on the ability to deploy naval power to keep the world’s transoceanic shipping routes and maritime straits open and free. Given the fact that the European Union is by far the largest trading power on Earth, this is an important security issue.

An elite European intervention force would provide us with the means to make a difference on the ground in international trouble spots, not least in the failed and failing states of the ‘Grand Area’. It would allow us to prevent future slaughters, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide, things which are antithetical to European values. We would also be in a better position to take retaliatory or even preventative action should there be an Islamist terror attack on European territory, allies or interests, something which will be of greater importance once the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified with its ‘Solidarity Clause’. And it might help with the ongoing development of a European geopolitical security culture, leading to convergence between the Member States in how they exercise diplomatic, economic and military power beyond our common borders. Finally, greater military capabilities will help Europeans gain more self-respect, and put an end to ‘civilian power’ illusions. In turn, this might help rebuild the Atlantic Alliance, so that Europeans and Americans can uphold a world in which our mutually reciprocal values can flourish.

Mr. Sarkozy’s ‘core group’ of Member States for military issues is emphatically a good idea, and Mr. Brown should support it. And because various Eurosceptics may shout and squawk loudly, the British government should tell the British people precisely why deeper European military cooperation is needed, and why Britain’s future is so closely bound with the rest of Europe. Given the missed opportunities of the past, the time has never been more conducive for Britain to lead from the front and take up its rightful place at the heart of the European Union.