Time for coherence over Kosovo

On Sunday or Monday, Kosovo is likely to finally declare its independence from Serbia. Hopefully this will be one of the final acts of the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession, which saw the Western Balkans degenerate into carnage and disorder. It will also lead to the creation of another country on the European continent, perhaps destined to become one day a Member State of the European Union. Equally, Serbia will be shorn of its remaining pretensions as a potential hegemon in the region; dreams of a ‘Greater Serbia’—which claimed so many lives during Slobodan Milosevic’s wars of aggression in the 1990s—will fall into the dirt. Pruned of Kosovo, Serbia will be but a rump of the former Yugoslavia, yet in a better position to face the future as a modern European nation. And as the power of the European Union moves in to fill the vacuum, the residue of Russian influence in the Western Balkans will evaporate.

This of course all relies on good policy, something Europeans have lacked until recently when dealing with the countries that were once Yugoslavia. Jacques Poos’ presumptuous declaration in 1991 that the ‘hour of Europe’ was upon us, that the European Community was ready and able to settle the urges of succession felt by many Yugoslavs, never came to be. Europeans looked on as an area proximate to their homeland witnessed the re-emergence of concentration camps, and as genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’ returned to haunt the continent. The murderous actions of Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica were certainly the most excessive of the violence, particularly as European soldiers were ordered not to intervene as the killing took place. In part, it was out of this failure that the Islamist movement gained ground, hoping to use the massacre as a means to recruit new blood to the Islamist cause—with enormous and ongoing implications. And that the Americans with their advocacy of a more aggressive and interventionist approach against the Serbs turned out to be right worked only to compound Europe’s ignominy. Far from being the ‘hour of Europe’, the whole affair became the hour that many Europeans have since tried hard to forget.

The stakes are still high. A poorly managed independence bid by Kosovo on the part of we Europeans could still see a return to considerable violence and bloodshed, leading to a serious security problem. And with the United States bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be no ‘Uncle Sam’ to come to our rescue. At least Europeans learnt certain things from their decade in the former Yugoslavia: the Bosnian wars produced the furrows into which the seeds of a wider, deeper and harder Common Foreign and Security Policy were planted, and for the subsequent creation of the European Security and Defence Policy. Tangible outcomes—from the European Rapid Reaction Force, the European Security Strategy, and the European Battlegroups, along with the new institutional architecture in Brussels—should ensure that we Europeans now have the capabilities to deal with similar disorder in the future. As such, the successful management of Kosovo’s independence might be considered as the culmination of what has been a difficult learning curve. But for those tools and policies to effectively be put into practice requires a coherent European stance to begin with. Unfortunately, that is the problem: Cyprus, Romania and Greece have continued to disagree with the common European line set down by London, Paris and Berlin, who are in turn supported by all remaining Member States.

The unhelpful approach to Kosovo taken by Cyprus and Greece raises issues concerning both Member States’ true allegiances. Mark Leonard, Director of the newly founded European Council on Foreign Relations, has accused them as being the ‘Trojan Horses’ for Russian interests in the European Union; that is to say, they often lean towards the Russian as opposed to the European approach on a range of issues, and veto European policy when the need arises. This is problematic at the best of times, but over the issue of Kosovo it is downright unacceptable. We cannot have certain Member States taking orders from foreign capitals, particularly when those capitals are increasingly arrogant, bellicose and working against our collective European interests.

On Kosovo, the Kremlin has taken an approach which is ‘fundamentally different’ to the positions of almost all of the Member States of the European Union. Russia is concerned that Kosovoan independence may set a precedent for those noisy groups in its soft underbelly, whom themselves desire independence from the Russian yoke. It is for this reason that Moscow flatly opposes any independence bid on the part of Kosovo. But this argument is flawed: European and American diplomats have been quite firm in stating that Kosovo is an exceptional case. The perception of Serbia in Kosovo is so bleak that artificially keeping the two communities together will sustain an unhappy marriage, which if left, will inevitably end in an ugly rather than a managed divorce.

Instead, what the Kremlin really fears is the fact that once the independence Kosovo becomes a reality, Russia’s remaining influence over the Western Balkans will be cracked open like a nut. As European power expands over both Kosovo—as a security provider—and Serbia—which will be left with no alternative other than a surge towards accession into its massive neighbour—the former Yugoslavia will gradually be engulfed by the European Union. As Europeans, we should welcome this: Russia, under the siloviki around Vladimir Putin, is no friend of ours. The country’s known and suspected behaviour towards the United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland, Norway, Georgia and Ukraine shows that Russia becomes more and more like a snarling bear with the passing of every week. This is amplified by Mr. Putin’s frequent diatribes against the West, whose language—as several British newspapers have pointed out—often invokes the ‘argot’ of a common ‘street-fighter’ instead of the eloquence generally expected from a head of state. Given mounting Russian hostility, Europeans should celebrate the removal of the Kremlin’s outposts from our own neighbourhood, and we should be implementing policies towards that end.

So what should the European Union do? First, and most obviously and importantly, the ‘Trojan Horses’ must stop being ‘Trojan Horses’. Cyprus, Romania and Greece must adhere to the common European approach set down by the British, French and Germans—and supported by everyone else—who, in any case, are the principal providers of the European Union’s foreign, security and defence capabilities.

Second, Brussels must prepare for a gradual transition towards full independence on the part of Prishtinë (the capital of Kosovo). This means that we must be willing to intervene robustly should violence break out after Kosovo gains control of its own future. If Serbian minorities come under renewed attack by extremists in the newly independent Kosovoan state, European Union armed forces must come to their aid. The upholding of order in the region is vital to our security and commercial expansion. That Brussels has prepared a preventative security force of 1,800 policemen, prosecutors and judges, ready to be sent to Kosovo on Saturday morning, will go some way in ensuring that the transition is peaceful. They will help the new Kosovoan government under the leadership of Hashim Thaçi settle down and bed in as the legitimate source of authority in the new country. This will also be something of a test of European resolve in the face of firm Russian opposition, and of European willingness to operate unilaterally outside of the United Nations (albeit with support from allies like the United States, Norway and Canada). As the European mission to Kosovo may not receive the United Nation’s formal blessing—due to the threat of a veto by the Kremlin—previous Security Council Resolutions may need to be ‘beefed up’ (otherwise known as distorted or spun) by Brussels in order to provide the mission with some semblance of legality under international law.

Finally, the European Union has to ensure that a long-term strategy is put in operation so that Serbia and Kosovo are absorbed into the European sphere of influence, as well as the wider Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. By electing the reformist pro-European Boris Tadić earlier this month, Serbs seem already to have chosen a European future over a Russian one. Europe must reward that decision appropriately, through aid and other forms of assistance, which might go some way in reducing Serbia’s upset at losing Kosovo.

Much rests on the next few weeks. Should we Europeans successfully manage Kosovo’s bid for independence, the peoples of the Western Balkans may finally be free to move into an age of reconciliation, and ready to put the horrors of the past behind them. If we succeed, a festering ulcer of instability will be healed, putting an end to one of the longest-running security threats to European prosperity. It is only through a robust and active approach on the part of the European Union that Kosovo, Serbia and the wider European homeland will be fused together in a common and democratic future.