Time for a new Atlantic Pact
Today, I had published in the public policy journal Europe’s World an article calling for a strong European Union in a renewed Atlantic Alliance. Co-authored with Alex Petersen, a colleague of mine who is an adjunct fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., our aim was to inject what we hoped would be some fresh thinking on what can often become a boring debate. We both believe strongly in the Atlantic Alliance, which binds together the European Union, the United States, and our allies like Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey, forming a wider community of democracies, which are committed to certain universal principles such as constitutional government, the rule of law, human rights, and a social or liberal culture. This community finds its concrete expression through NATO, a military pact constituted in 1949, initially to contain Soviet aggression, but whose role is today more of a global stabilisation force. Yet we suggest that this powerful alliance of freedom—which served us all so well during the Cold War—is in need of some serious re-calibration, particularly on the part of Europe. As we put it:
Europeans must get real. As Machiavelli warned, it is all very well to be loved, but it is also necessary to be feared. At a time of rising military expenditure in China and Russia—and amongst a plethora of lesser powers—Europeans cannot look the other way. Europe must uphold its capacity to defend its communication routes and protect its partners and allies. What would Europe do if extremists hijacked aeroplanes and flew them into Canary Wharf, La Defense or central Frankfurt? What would Europe do if a foreign government was found to have provided those terrorists with support? In such an uncertain world, the need for higher European defence spending and military integration, and the merging of the European defence-industrial base, has never been greater.
We argue that the European Union must make the necessary institutional, instrumental and doctrinal changes so that it can emerge as a ‘global power’, and that it must be willing to engage, sometimes robustly, overseas in order to uphold the international economic and political system, which we depend upon for our security and prosperity. In other words, Europeans cannot consign themselves only to peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations, but must also be prepared to involve themselves in the rough and tumble of geopolitics. We call for the creation of a European Security Council to help assist with this strategic transition, and for a European Security Advisor to lead it.
We suggest that this is all necessary because the world system may be undergoing radical realignment, from one centred on the North Atlantic basin—that is to say, Western civilisation—to one that is truly multipolar in size and scope. And much as the Victorian world structured under the Pax Britannica collapsed into radical disorder and carnage, something comparable could happen to the present Pax Americana. This must not be allowed to happen. Europeans and Americans must work together. So a stronger Europe will not only benefit the security of our own continental homeland, but will also aid our American allies, and other countries all over the world. A stronger Europe will also mean that Americans are more willing to work with us, reducing any unilateral tendencies.
We end with the following words:
Without developing much greater military strength, Europeans will find themselves progressively marginalised. They will discover that the system they depend on for security and commerce will come under mounting pressure if they leave to their American ally the lonely task of upholding world order. A weak Europe and a strained United States serves the interests of neither partner, so Americans should offer their full support and encouragement to a stronger and more integrated Europe. Should both sides fail to do so, Europeans and Americans will not so much drift apart but find themselves aimlessly at sea in the same boat.
The time has come for a more autonomous and capable European Union, but not one detached from the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies, of which we Europeans form a key part. As the European Security Strategy says: ‘The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world...This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.’ Not only do Europeans and Americans share a common history, but we also face a similar set of challenges and threats in the future. With American support, Europeans can become stronger, and both powers can together make the world a better and safer place.
• Please click here to read the full article.
4 comments:
Your vision for the security policy of the Union is, at least to me, deeply disturbing. Lets start with defense expenditures. As you pointed out in a recent blog post, the EU spends as much as the rest of the world combined, if the USA, our ally, is not considered. From this a simple minded citizen like me would conclude that we spend enough to fight of any credible threat. Even more, if I consider the fact that we actually own nuclear weapons. I agree with you that we need a comprehensive nuclear deterrence policy. But if this is implemented (and we should be able to pay for this comfortably with 1.5 Gross Domestic Product average defense spending) then who should attack us? China? Russia? And risk nuclear annihilation. I think that is rather unlikely.
But indeed you give the answer what we would do with our new awesome military.
"The third point to be made is that Europeans need to become more assertive, both in their new neighborhood and further afield. This will demand a far more strategic approach to foreign and defense issues, and a willingness to get tough and "contain" any governments that oppose Europe's security, energy and economic interests."
Maybe the picture which these sentences conjures in my head is something completely different then what you have in mind. I certainly hope so.
Your role model for the EU military policy is clearly the USA. But how well have the decisions made by the recent rather aggressive government served their Nation. Not nation in some abstract sense, but what did the citizens get from it? Nothing! Nothing but sky high dept and hatred everywhere around the globe. Is this the model we want to emulate? Really?
I will not stand for a Union which follows policies you lay out in your article. Given the strong opposition in the EU to the Iraq intervention I also think that any attempt to move into this direction would be the end of further political integration. Many on the political right wing already oppose the European project because of their attachment to the concept of the Nation state. Strong militarist policies would destroy all support for a Union on the left. This would be the end of any dreams of a united European Continent.
RZ: 1.5% of military spending is not enough. The minimum NATO benchmark is 2%, which is still probably not enough. Defence inflation (the cost of running the armed forces) runs at 6% annually, and defence budgets have remained static or have shrunk in every Member State bar Britain and France—I’ll leave you to draw the conclusions about what this means and leads to. We need to spend more, and spend it more wisely.
On the point of using armed force: you’re absolutely correct. The model for the whole of Europe is is provided by Britain and France, which frequently use their armed forces to engage in geopolitical engineering. They have global intervention forces; almost all the other Member States—particularly Germany—have what might be described as mere defence forces. The Dutch, Italians and Spanish also have some ‘expeditionary’ capabilities, but these are limited. Defence forces can only be used for territorial defence, and not for the purposes of foreign policy. They are so useless in the modern geopolitical environment that any Member State contemplating the maintenance of such a force might as well disband it. To use the example of Germany—because it is such an excellent example—it has about 300,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen, yet only a fraction of these (approximately 10,000) can be deployed at any one time, and even then, only when ‘slotted-in’ to the militaries of other Member States like France or Britain—or the United States. This is because the Bundewehr has limited ‘power projection’ equipment, like aircraft carriers and landing platforms. You might ask why this is a problem, and I detect from your response that this is what you ask?
My response would be clear: The world is a volatile place, and things can change very quickly. Do not assume that Europeans will just be left alone by foreign powers, powers which often do not have our interests at heart, or share our values. Do not suppose we can ultimately rely on ‘international law’ or the United Nations for our security. This is not so; any power with sufficient resources could sweep either aside in a flash, just as the United States did over Iraq. Do not imagine that the United States will always be there to come to our rescue. Britain and France realised that America might not in all reality be willing to trade New York for Paris or London in a nuclear war, and both armed themselves with atomic weapons accordingly. And do understand that major centres of power are rising almost by the month—not least China, India and Russia. Within ten years, on current projections, all will leave even the biggest European Union Member States trailing in the geopolitical slow lane.
Indeed, to use the example of the Strait of Malacca, which separates Malaysia from Indonesia: almost a quarter of European maritime commerce passes through this strait. It is only 2.8kms wide at its narrowest point and less than 30m deep. It could be easily blocked by a terrorist attack on a large ship or even by the navy of a small regional power (it also suffers from frequent piracy, but that’s another matter). What would we do then? Rely on the United States, Singapore or Australia to assist? This is an even bigger question for somewhere like Germany (less so for the United Kingdom or France, as they probably still have sufficient naval strength to force their way through), particularly given its position as the world’s second biggest exporter. And if a crisis would cause trouble for Germany, how would Portugal, Finland or Belgium respond?
Other narrow passages include the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of our oil passes, and the Strait of Magellan, which connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Should a major war break out in any one of these areas, without the United States, we would be in serious trouble.
The same goes for our allies. Take plucky little Georgia, for instance. What will happen should Russian rearmament continue at its current pace? You might find that small countries in the European Neighbourhood will come under Russia’s sway. Threats are always going to be more potent than persuasion; note the recent behaviour of the Ukrainians when threatened by Mr. Putin. That is not to say that we go about threatening potential allies, but rather that we sustain an adequate balance of power in our favour that prevents competitors from harming or even thinking about harming our interests.
So to cut to the chase, the point I am trying to make is that European unification cannot and emphatically will not take place within a vacuum. Without more military integration, the Right’s attachment to the nation-state will be meaningless anyway. Weak countries are not sovereign, so will count for little. And the Left must accept that the world is not utopian, and that we need the assistance of Machiavelli and Hobbes when conducting foreign policy. Unless we can protect and defend what we have achieved within Europe, European integration will unravel, pulled apart by forces all around us. This is why a strong European Union is essential. In the modern world, our hopes and aspirations can only be realised on a continental-sized land. We have the vehicle—the European Union—and we must cast away the illusions and be willing to use it.
James, I agree with much of what you say, although I would ask you to think through both adventurism and imperialism as you grow older.
At the same time, there are no guarantees that the meek will inherit the world we live in.
Europe should be firm on defence, but I think that almost unbelievable improvement could be achieved at current spending levels if the treaty structures and the policy making institutions were improved, a common defence established and procurement radically improved.
Then the question would be if additional spending was needed, based on security assessments and technological capabilities.
I agree that a renewed NATO continues to be an important alliance of democracies on both shores of the Atlantic, in tandem with a real EU defence.
Hello Ralf: I was not aware I was arguing for imperialism! I certainly believe in what might be called an ‘offensive defence’ though. As the European Security Strategy states: ‘With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad.’ From my own—I suppose peculiarly British—reading of history, it strikes me that the little fish always gets swallowed by the big fish in the end. I believe in the values that underpin the Euro-Atlantic community, and do not want them to be harmed. So I want us to be a big fish, albeit not one that is overly aggressive or carnivorous!
On defence spending, I must reconfirm that I am not advocating massive spending increases. Given that every Member State spends more than 1% of its Gross Domestic Product on defence, the rise would only be—and often less than—a 1% increase. And I quite agree that we can achieve greater economies of scale with further defence and military integration; indeed, that is more important at this point.
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