The great German strategic awakening?

A week ago the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union (the German conservatives) revealed their first major attempt at compiling a security strategy for the Federal Republic of Germany. Had a major political grouping in Britain or France created such a document, the only interest among the public and concerned parties would likely have been its content; both Member States, after all, have long and renowned military histories. Indeed, Britain revealed its own National Security Strategy in March, while France is due to outline a comprehensive Defence White Paper in the next few months. What is significant about the German attempt is the fact that certain elements of German society felt it necessary to produce a security strategy in the first place. While Germany has, since 1945, been very reluctant to discuss concepts like defence and security, the German armed forces—the Bundeswehr—have been deployed in ever greater numbers in the Balkans and Afghanistan in recent years, as Germany has gradually taken a greater—albeit still very modest—role in upholding global security through the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. So if anything, it is a shame a German National Security Strategy was not crafted a long time ago.

Ulrike Guerot and Daniel Korski, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, suggest that the Christian Democrats may have other motives for producing their security strategy at the current time. As they ask:

Could it be as a reaction to the publication in London, and preparation in Paris, of a National Security Strategy and a Defence White Paper, respectively? Or is it in response to the recent Franco-British ‘Schulterschluss’ on European defence, to show that Berlin is not lagging behind? Or, alternatively, could it be seen as a preemptive move by Berlin to determine the content of the European Security Strategy, expected to be revised under the French EU Presidency?[1]

The answer is that it is probably connected with all of these things—and rightly so. Germany is the biggest, richest and most populous Member State of the European Union. It is an established liberal democracy, and the largest exporter in the world. Yet in the realm of security and defence, it has had a tendency to consume security, rather than help to provide it, a task left primarily to the American, British and French armed forces. Indeed, Germany has one of the lowest per capita military budgets in the European Union; it spends a lousy 1.3% of its Gross National Product on defence; and the Bundeswehr continues to drag its feet with military reform, tending towards conscript forces and land armour, rather than moving into the expeditionary warfighting capabilities required for the kind of overseas interventions as set out in the European Security Strategy.[2] Having said that, much of this is not so much the fault of the Bundeswehr, but rather the political establishment and the indifference of the German public, who seem to have lost their will for a fight. The German contribution to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, for example, has been poor: German soldiers are not allowed to be deployed along the front lines, leaving the heavy lifting to the British, Danes, Dutch, Canadians—and the United States.

So the German attempt at discussing security and defence represents a movement in the right direction. What is more, the content of the Christian Democrats’ security strategy mirrors in many ways the European Security Strategy. Similar to the latter, it outlines the following as the key threats facing Germany and the rest of the European Union: (1) Organised terrorism; (2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3) energy and raw materials insecurity and supply problems; (4) the consequences of climate change; and (5) the threat posed by overseas conflict and zones of chaos. In light of these threats and challenges, the security strategy proposes that Germany has to: (1) enhance network homeland protection and disaster management; (2) strengthen civilian and military instruments for intervention abroad; (3) upgrade energy security provisions and bring into being a National Security Council; and (4) increase links with the business and scientific communities. It also mentions the need for better German integration into the European Security and Defence Policy.

While the security strategy does not say very much about the importance or the need to use armed force—other than for combating terrorism—it does talk of ‘policing’ and ‘crisis management’, which are perhaps the German codewords for military intervention. Equally, although the Christian Democrats’ proposal for the European Union to take far greater responsibilities for energy security are worthy of further consideration, little is said about the often deferential and flawed German approach towards Russia and the Kremlin, not least the failure of the German government to re-invest in the one form of power able to meet Germany’s growing requirements: nuclear energy. But what is perhaps most significant is that the word ‘pre-emptive’ is used three times, along with some fairly assertive rhetoric. As the security strategy puts it:

Together with our partners we must make a concerted effort to increase our prevention capabilities in order to pre-empt conflict and crises and be in a position to offer solutions for stabilisation that take into consideration cultural and religious issues...Pursuing our interests and strategic objectives will require taking action in a more active, timely, speedy, coherent and, if necessary, firm manner. We must apply this to all the instruments and capabilities at our disposal for conducting crisis management and conflict prevention...We must have the capacity to act before a crisis occurs. If violent conflict cannot be averted, we must be prepared to combat it in its place of origin, especially if we can anticipate negative consequences for Germany’s security and that of its citizens.[3]

This could just be a mistranslation of ‘preventive’, but if not it certainly represents boldness, especially given the controversy in Germany over the idea of ‘pre-emptive defence’ after the revealing of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ in the United States in 2002. Due to the mounting dangers in the modern world, options clearly need to be kept open, and ‘pre-emption’ must be one of them—any European government thinking otherwise is passing on the responsibilities it has to protect its citizens. So the Christian Democrats must be congratulated in bringing the concept of ‘pre-emption’ into the debate.

However, they should not be congratulated for some rather silly statements in their security strategy about universal nuclear disarmament: so unlikely is this, that it is unworthy even of discussion. If anything, given the threats the European Union is likely to face as it deploys progressively more civilian and military missions overseas in the coming years—perhaps even from a rogue regime armed with atomic weapons—Britain and France may need to consider transferring their ballistic missiles up to the European level, or at the very least promise to use them should any fellow Member State be attacked with a weapon of mass destruction. So far from repeating outmoded—even puerile—ideas, the Christian Democrats should be preparing the German public for accepting the inevitable, that is, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the European Union, including the means to deliver them.

Those problems aside, the Christian Democrats’ security strategy is a good start, and moves German strategic thinking in the right direction. It mirrors in many places not only the British and French approaches to ‘grand strategy’, but also the European Security Strategy. Indeed, the Christian Democrats’ security strategy includes, at the very beginning, the most powerful line from the European Security Strategy: ‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.’ Here, what we may be witnessing is a two-step process: first, British and French strategic thinking is being transferred up to the European level, thereby shaping the European Security and Defence Policy, which, in turn, is second, filtering down and developing the lesser strategic cultures in the other Member States—like Germany. This should be welcomed.

And yet, having been taught how to ‘do’ security by Britain and France, Germany must not relinquish its attachment to the European Union. Indeed, equipped with a more assertive Anglo-French style approach, Germany might find itself in a far stronger position to shape European foreign, security and defence policies, making Berlin more of a security provider, rather than a security consumer. Simultaneously, Britain and France should integrate themselves more deeply into the European Security and Defence Policy, throwing everything they’ve got into making it assertive, efficient and credible. But for the time being, Germany now needs to decide whether it should adopt the Christian Democrats’ security strategy, and moreover, whether it will actually lead to concrete improvements—like the increasing of Germany’s military capacity and armaments spending—or whether it is to remain nothing more than hot air.

[1] Ulrike Guerot and Daniel Korski, 2008, ‘New German Security Strategy—going it alone?’.
[2] For more on German military spending in relations to other parts of the European Union, see the European Defence Agency’s National Defence Expenditure in 2006.
[3] Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union, 2008, A Security Strategy for Germany, p. 9 , p. 11 and p. 13.