Time for a new Atlantic Pact

Today, I had published in the public policy journal Europe’s World an article calling for a strong European Union in a renewed Atlantic Alliance. Co-authored with Alex Petersen, a colleague of mine who is an adjunct fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., our aim was to inject what we hoped would be some fresh thinking on what can often become a boring debate. We both believe strongly in the Atlantic Alliance, which binds together the European Union, the United States, and our allies like Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey, forming a wider community of democracies, which are committed to certain universal principles such as constitutional government, the rule of law, human rights, and a social or liberal culture. This community finds its concrete expression through NATO, a military pact constituted in 1949, initially to contain Soviet aggression, but whose role is today more of a global stabilisation force. Yet we suggest that this powerful alliance of freedom—which served us all so well during the Cold War—is in need of some serious re-calibration, particularly on the part of Europe.

As we put it:

Europeans must get real. As Machiavelli warned, it is all very well to be loved, but it is also necessary to be feared. At a time of rising military expenditure in China and Russia—and amongst a plethora of lesser powers—Europeans cannot look the other way. Europe must uphold its capacity to defend its communication routes and protect its partners and allies. What would Europe do if extremists hijacked aeroplanes and flew them into Canary Wharf, La Defense or central Frankfurt? What would Europe do if a foreign government was found to have provided those terrorists with support? In such an uncertain world, the need for higher European defence spending and military integration, and the merging of the European defence-industrial base, has never been greater.

We argue that the European Union must make the necessary institutional, instrumental and doctrinal changes so that it can emerge as a ‘global power’, and that it must be willing to engage, sometimes robustly, overseas in order to uphold the international economic and political system, which we depend upon for our security and prosperity. In other words, Europeans cannot consign themselves only to peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations, but must also be prepared to involve themselves in the rough and tumble of geopolitics. We call for the creation of a European Security Council to help assist with this strategic transition, and for a European Security Advisor to lead it.

We suggest that this is all necessary because the world system may be undergoing radical realignment, from one centred on the North Atlantic basin—that is to say, Western civilisation—to one that is truly multipolar in size and scope. And much as the Victorian world structured under the Pax Britannica collapsed into radical disorder and carnage, something comparable could happen to the present Pax Americana. This must not be allowed to happen. Europeans and Americans must work together. So a stronger Europe will not only benefit the security of our own continental homeland, but will also aid our American allies, and other countries all over the world. A stronger Europe will also mean that Americans are more willing to work with us, reducing any unilateral tendencies.

We end with the following words:

Without developing much greater military strength, Europeans will find themselves progressively marginalised. They will discover that the system they depend on for security and commerce will come under mounting pressure if they leave to their American ally the lonely task of upholding world order. A weak Europe and a strained United States serves the interests of neither partner, so Americans should offer their full support and encouragement to a stronger and more integrated Europe. Should both sides fail to do so, Europeans and Americans will not so much drift apart but find themselves aimlessly at sea in the same boat.

The time has come for a more autonomous and capable European Union, but not one detached from the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies, of which we Europeans form a key part. As the European Security Strategy says: ‘The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world...This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.’ Not only do Europeans and Americans share a common history, but we also face a similar set of challenges and threats in the future. With American support, Europeans can become stronger, and both powers can together make the world a better and safer place.

• Please click here to read the full article.

New presidents for Europe and America?

The presidential race in the United States has been well underway for quite some time. Everyone has heard of the frontrunners John McCain, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, and even those who have dropped out like Rudolph Giuliani. Less well known though is the fact that the position of ‘President of Europe’ is also up for grabs from 2009—or as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified and comes into force across our continent. In reality, the person who assumes the position will be president of the European Council, whose role it is to set the general political guidelines and steer the direction of the European Union. The ‘president’ will be able to hold the post for up to five years depending on renewal and will have the mandate to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers, represent the Member States, and act as a mediator between their competing interests. But he or she might also be able to craft out a position of authority, actually driving policy by shaping the parameters of debate. In part, depending on the candidate, the new position is likely to be one of considerable influence, which could lead to enhanced coordination and cooperation at the European level.

Several names have already been put forward for the post. The European Council will appoint the best candidate either in late 2008 or early 2009, depending on the speed of the ratification process in each of the Member States. Out of several potential candidates, one name keeps popping up again and again and that name is Tony Blair. Online petitions have already been formed by the usual suspects in order to try and prevent his appointment, and a group on Facebook has already been formed to support him. Other potential personalities include Jean-Claude Juncker, Wolfgang Schüssel and Romano Prodi. I have to lay my cards on the table at this point and confess that I think Tony Blair—who is currently the Middle East Peace Envoy—is not merely the only dynamic candidate out of what remains as as otherwise rather uninspiring bunch, but is actually the natural candidate for the post. So why would Tony Blair make a good president of the European Council?

First, Mr. Blair is one of the most well-known politicians in the world. Unlike Mr. Prodi he is not a political failure, having been the only Labour prime minister in the United Kingdom to gain three consecutive terms in office. While many consider him to be a controversial figure, particularly given his support for the removal of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, he is nevertheless a dynamic speaker, and a figure of authority. Some of his speeches—such as his ‘Speech to the European Parliament’ in 2005, or his speech on the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ in Chicago during 1999—were truly groundbreaking, and in some ways have changed the course of European and global history. As European Council president, people from all over our continent and the wider world would be very likely to be interested in what Mr. Blair has to say on any range of issues. This can only be to the benefit of Europe, which will be provided with a higher international profile and greater cultural reach.

Second, the very fact that Mr. Blair is such a controversial figure is perhaps something to celebrate. What could be worse than a staid and politically boring figure as European Council president—a person of consensus, unwilling to make his or her voice heard above the din of contemporary European politics? While having Mr. Blair as president could turn droves of people against the project of European integration, he could also inject a renewed sense of political purpose in the whole project as people fight to have appointed a different candidate. Political struggle is constitutive of the socio-political community; without it, there could be no society. Unwittingly, by appointing Mr. Blair as president, European leaders could contribute to the ongoing creation of a European public sphere, whose emergence is already apparent within the blogosphere. The debate might even contribute one day to the prospect of an elected president and a connected European presidential race, which would provide the European Union with enhanced democratic legitimacy.

Third, Tony Blair would automatically command the respect of the other great powers. He is listened to in Washington, and has the political will and assertiveness to stand up to our competitors, such as the Russians and Iranians. As the former political head of the British state, he has a solid understanding of the dynamics of the international system, and a good knowledge of the way in which Europeans can exercise world power. Potential candidates like Romano Prodi, Wolfgang Schüssel and Jean-Claude Juncker come nowhere close in this area. Mr. Prodi cannot even keep together his own government in Italy. Wolfgang Schüssel maintained the so-called neutrality of Austria, meaning that he is hardly a good representative of Europe, while Mr. Juncker comes from Luxembourg, which is not known for its worldwide influence—something the European Union must inevitably have. Luxembourg is marginally larger in population than the city of Oxford, and little bigger in area than Greater London. And the delicacies of the Italian political system mean that Italy is not known for its global reach, even though it is comparable economically and demographically to France and Britain. That the first president of the European Council should come from one of the biggest Member States has seemingly also been acknowledged by Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown, who have both thrown their weight behind Tony Blair.

Finally, Mr. Blair is often criticised as having failed to bring Britain to the heart of Europe during his time in office. On so many levels this is right: he could have done more, not least in bringing Britain into the Schengen zone, and even the Euro. But Mr. Blair does better in other areas. He was instrumental in the widening, deepening and hardening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the constitution of the European Security and Defence Policy. Those have been the two ‘growth areas’ of European integration since the latter 1990s, and further developments in these areas underpin many of the provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon. So actually, while the former British prime minister may have failed to convince the British public of the merits of European integration, he has certainly done much for the European cause. And that he has already expressed a keen interest in upgrading European military capabilities means that defence integration would be a key area of concentration under his potential presidency.

So in light of the four points identified above, Tony Blair could be a more attractive candidate than many people might at first realise. I therefore urge all Europeans to support his appointment as the first ‘President of Europe’.

Now we should turn briefly to the presidential race across the Atlantic. From a reading of the recent foreign policy ambitions of each of the major American contenders in Foreign Affairs, John McCain comes out in a very positive light. As he argued in his contribution to the journal:

The United States did not single-handedly win the Cold War; the transatlantic alliance did, in concert with partners around the world. The bonds we share with Europe in terms of history, values, and interests are unique. Unfortunately, they have frayed. As president, one of my top foreign policy priorities will be to revitalise the transatlantic partnership. Americans should welcome the rise of a strong, confident European Union. The future of the transatlantic relationship lies in confronting the challenges of the twenty-first century worldwide: developing a common energy policy, creating a transatlantic common market tying our economies more closely together, and institutionalising our cooperation on issues such as climate change, foreign assistance, and democracy promotion.

This means that Mr. McCain is the only candidate to have explicitly mentioned the necessity of a renewed transatlantic alliance, and for the need of the United States to work with the European Union. As such, he has identified the unilateral tendencies of George W. Bush and his administration as decidedly unhelpful, and he seems to look forward to dealing with Europeans as a united bloc (instead of Britons, French, Germans, and so on). Moreover, his proposals for a global League of Democracies might go some way in meeting the American urge for spreading democracy abroad and the European desire to build strong and effective global multilateral institutions. A Democratic League would integrate the two approaches in a synthesis, leading to better transatlantic relations. And Tony Blair, who also supports both the spread of constitutional government and the need for a vigorous Atlantic Alliance, would be keen to work with Mr. McCain for their mutual realisation.

In their contributions to Foreign Affairs, the other candidates made only brief comments about the European Union. Hillary Clinton made a fleeting remark about the European Union as a model for Africa, while Barack Obama did not even discuss it, other than to say that the European Union is a leading source of pollution. This suggests that their worldviews are either outdated or that their priorities rest elsewhere. John McCain, on the other hand, has explicitly stated that he welcomes ‘the rise of strong, confident European Union’, indicating that he looks forward to working with us as Europeans. Although—as a progressive—I would have sympathies with the domestic agenda of Barack Obama, or even Hillary Clinton (though I am not keen on the establishment of political dynasties), I still believe to some extent in the principle of the national interest. That is to say that rather than standing in solidarity with political allies in foreign countries, we must instead pay closer attention to the way in which foreign leaders might assist our own agenda. The European interest must always come first; hence I urge Europeans to begin thinking about how we can work with the United States under John McCain.

European militarisation gathers pace under new proposals

European Voice, the European-oriented subsidiary newspaper of The Economist, today reported that Nicolas Sarkozy, the current president of France, had reopened the debate on the need for a greater level of military integration in the European Union. This comes at a time when the French are undertaking a comprehensive defence review, which is nearing completion. This is important, not least because France is, after the United Kingdom, the only other European Union Member State with near comprehensive military forces, backed up by the full plethora of naval and aerial platforms, including nuclear weapons, missile firing submarines, and the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier outside of the United States Navy. Unless France and Britain move together, any issue surrounding European defence is a quite simply a non-starter.

Mr. Sarkozy proposes that a ‘core group’ of the European Union’s strongest military powers be formed once the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified and operational—probably sometime during 2009. This group, he suggests, would include Poland, Spain, Italy and Germany, which would be led by France and the United Kingdom. Its role would be to pioneer the enhancement and integration of the European Union’s twenty-seven (or perhaps twenty-six, given that Denmark has an opt-out from the European Security and Defence Policy) different militaries, which are prone to massive inefficiency and waste. The Member States’ agglomerated defence spending of some €201 billion (£149 billion; $294 billion)—which, bar the United States, is larger than the rest of the world’s defence budgets combined—might finally begin to meet similar economies of scale as the Americans. Currently, there are numerous different national military projects underway, and often these are motivated by regional economic needs instead of a solid commitment to either serious military capability or economic efficiency. This problem is compounded by differing national needs, particularly as the smaller Member States do not have the industrial capacity or financial resources to pay for the same sort of kit as the French and British. Across the European Union, there are presently under construction numerous different tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, helicopters, strike-fighters, destroyers, frigates, assault ships, and aircraft carriers, leading to unnecessary duplication and often poor interoperability.

This, of course, leads to a vicious circle, further complicated by defence inflation, and low levels of military expenditure, particularly in the smaller and medium-sized Member States—and some of the larger ones, not least Spain, Italy and Germany, each spending merely between 1.1% and 1.8% of their Gross Domestic Products on defence. It all adds up to a continuous degrading of European armed forces, which were once the most ruthless, efficient and lethal in the world. And to make matters worse, the reduced state of capability and readiness leads to the derogation of the European defence-industrial base, allowing foreign competitors to gain ground on us almost every year. This is a sorry state of affairs, which further reduces our global power and authority, leading to the wishful thinking and reckless idealism that are often and rightly criticised by the United States. And given the growing disparity between the American armed forces and their European counterparts, Europeans are increasingly less able to contribute anything of real substance to the transatlantic partnership, reducing the effectiveness of NATO, and producing an environment more conducive to American unilateralism.

Much of this was all realised a long time ago, starting during the Gulf War in 1991. The issue was raised again after the subsequent Bosnian and Kosovo wars, culminating in the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan, where many European militaries have found it difficult to integrate with the Americans—or even other Europeans like the British and French. The drive to enhance European military capabilities was in part responsible for the St. Malo Accords between Britain and France in 1998, whose aim was to provide for a greater level of European military autonomy within NATO. While a number of initiatives followed, these have been less successful than initially hoped, not least because of the acrimony and divisions that arose out of Tony Blair and George W. Bush’s decision to remove the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. But with the changes of leadership in London and Paris in 2007, the conditions may now be right for Britain and France to take European defence integration onto a new plane.

This is certainly what Mr. Sarkozy hopes. He has already suggested that his priority under the French presidency of the European Council in the second half of this year will be to drive forward the European Security and Defence Policy. He has called for a redrafting of the European Security Strategy, which was first compiled in 2003 by Robert Cooper and Javier Solana. While an excellent first stab at painting a European strategic doctrine, recent events in Russia and elsewhere demand additional amendments to take on board new strategic realities. The British foreign secretary, David Miliband, is also said to be keen on the idea, and is suspected of sharing the French president’s desires to bolster European militaries. Reports in The Guardian stated that in the initial version of his ‘Europe as a Model Power’ speech in January, Mr. Miliband even went so far as to call for a comprehensive pan-European defence review. This will certainly be needed at some point, especially if Mr. Sarkozy’s ‘core group’ is established next year.

While the measures needed for Europeans to get out of the military doldrums seem abundantly clear, Britain and France have continued to talk past one another. Invoking Shakespeare, Nick Witney, the former head of the European Defence Agency, and currently a senior policy fellow of the European Council on Foreign Relations, eloquently put it like this:

Much Ado about Nothing is the story of Beatrice and Benedick—a couple clearly, to everyone but them, destined for each other. But, each fiercely independent, they waste years talking past each other, mistiming their mutual approaches, indulging in unhelpful flirtations elsewhere, and generally delighting in sticking fingers in each other’s psychological wounds. Sounds familiar? For...[Beatrice and Benedick], it was at last a case of All’s Well that Ends Well. For Britain and France, the drama is not yet played out.

The two sticking points regard the transatlantic relationship and the United States. Britain has long remained strongly attached to NATO, while France has sought to pursue a more Europeanised and autonomous approach. It was hoped that the St. Malo Accords, which tried to merge both perspectives, would get past this problem, yet it still remains. However, a grand bargain can be struck: if Britain commits to full European military autonomy—including an independent military headquarters—France will rejoin NATO’s integrated command structures. At least this is the idea currently being mooted, not least by Mr. Sarkozy’s new administration itself, which will help France cast off Gaullism. Britain should play ball, because a strong and autonomous Europe will enhance the reach and capacity of NATO, particularly as it mounts increasingly sophisticated out-of-area operations.

Indeed, the need of a strong and militarily capable European Union has never been greater. The ongoing rise of China, India and Russia, alongside a myriad of regional powers like Brazil and Iran, means that the power of the European Union’s individual Member States—even Britain and France—is in a steady but relative decline. And London, Paris and Berlin’s influence in Washington has also been reduced. This is due to the growing Asian-Pacific orientation of the United States, but also the widening gulf of power between the two sides of the Atlantic. Fifty years ago, the United States and the United Kingdom were more evenly matched than they are today, while the Cold War kept America deeply interested in European affairs. This is no longer the case.

So the French proposal is a good one, and one that Gordon Brown’s Labour government should support. But British support should not end in mere lip service, or some form of reluctant or indifferent acceptance. Military issues are an area that Britain has the experience, expertise and knowledge to lead with from the front. As a military power, Britain is greatly respected by other Europeans, and has its forces forwardly deployed in over eighty countries. Anglo-French leadership could enable Europeans to protect themselves with their own missile defence system—instead of relying on the Americans—while simultaneously becoming a major intelligence and space power in the twenty-first century. These are certainly the three military platforms Mr. Sarkozy has in mind. Integration in this area would build on current Anglo-French cooperation on a common class of aircraft carrier, which might eventually provide the European Union with the ability to deploy three supercarriers of approximately 75,000 tonnes. Anglo-French leadership could increase European military power in many other areas, from unmanned aeroplane technology to naval and logistical support capacity—there really is no limit.

By leading a ‘core group’, London and Paris may also be able to set an example to those Member States unwilling to pull their weight. Already mentioned are Germany, Italy and Spain’s appallingly low level of defence spending, but they are not the only culprits. Mr. Sarkozy has suggested that all members of the European defence group should be willing to spend at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defence. Only Britain, France, Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria currently spend that amount. All other Member States are way below what is actually a NATO-recommended benchmark. In comparison, the United States spends about 4% of its Gross Domestic Product—which is still far less than Cold War levels of defence spending. And if the big Member States increase their spending, they might also be able to convince—either through pressure or by example—the others to do so too. In any case, European militaries and the defence-industrial base can only gain, which will enhance the security of all of us in an increasingly volatile era.

But Mr. Sarkozy hopes that military integration within the ‘core group’ will ultimately lead to a large and elite European intervention force, able to be deployed anywhere in the world. The creation of this force would propel Europe fully onto the world stage, particularly if Member States’ overseas military bases are ‘Europeanised’. Anglo-French leadership would see the European Union finally coming of age as a global military power, armed with the capacity to enforce its will on foreign countries, providing Europeans with more international clout and authority. It will also enable us to help the United States uphold the global economy, which itself rests on the ability to deploy naval power to keep the world’s transoceanic shipping routes and maritime straits open and free. Given the fact that the European Union is by far the largest trading power on Earth, this is an important security issue.

An elite European intervention force would provide us with the means to make a difference on the ground in international trouble spots, not least in the failed and failing states of the ‘Grand Area’. It would allow us to prevent future slaughters, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide, things which are antithetical to European values. We would also be in a better position to take retaliatory or even preventative action should there be an Islamist terror attack on European territory, allies or interests, something which will be of greater importance once the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified with its ‘Solidarity Clause’. And it might help with the ongoing development of a European geopolitical security culture, leading to convergence between the Member States in how they exercise diplomatic, economic and military power beyond our common borders. Finally, greater military capabilities will help Europeans gain more self-respect, and put an end to ‘civilian power’ illusions. In turn, this might help rebuild the Atlantic Alliance, so that Europeans and Americans can uphold a world in which our mutually reciprocal values can flourish.

Mr. Sarkozy’s ‘core group’ of Member States for military issues is emphatically a good idea, and Mr. Brown should support it. And because various Eurosceptics may shout and squawk loudly, the British government should tell the British people precisely why deeper European military cooperation is needed, and why Britain’s future is so closely bound with the rest of Europe. Given the missed opportunities of the past, the time has never been more conducive for Britain to lead from the front and take up its rightful place at the heart of the European Union.

Time for coherence over Kosovo

On Sunday or Monday, Kosovo is likely to finally declare its independence from Serbia. Hopefully this will be one of the final acts of the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession, which saw the Western Balkans degenerate into carnage and disorder. It will also lead to the creation of another country on the European continent, perhaps destined to become one day a Member State of the European Union. Equally, Serbia will be shorn of its remaining pretensions as a potential hegemon in the region; dreams of a ‘Greater Serbia’—which claimed so many lives during Slobodan Milosevic’s wars of aggression in the 1990s—will fall into the dirt. Pruned of Kosovo, Serbia will be but a rump of the former Yugoslavia, yet in a better position to face the future as a modern European nation. And as the power of the European Union moves in to fill the vacuum, the residue of Russian influence in the Western Balkans will evaporate.

This of course all relies on good policy, something Europeans have lacked until recently when dealing with the countries that were once Yugoslavia. Jacques Poos’ presumptuous declaration in 1991 that the ‘hour of Europe’ was upon us, that the European Community was ready and able to settle the urges of succession felt by many Yugoslavs, never came to be. Europeans looked on as an area proximate to their homeland witnessed the re-emergence of concentration camps, and as genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’ returned to haunt the continent. The murderous actions of Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica were certainly the most excessive of the violence, particularly as European soldiers were ordered not to intervene as the killing took place. In part, it was out of this failure that the Islamist movement gained ground, hoping to use the massacre as a means to recruit new blood to the Islamist cause—with enormous and ongoing implications. And that the Americans with their advocacy of a more aggressive and interventionist approach against the Serbs turned out to be right worked only to compound Europe’s ignominy. Far from being the ‘hour of Europe’, the whole affair became the hour that many Europeans have since tried hard to forget.

The stakes are still high. A poorly managed independence bid by Kosovo on the part of we Europeans could still see a return to considerable violence and bloodshed, leading to a serious security problem. And with the United States bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be no ‘Uncle Sam’ to come to our rescue. At least Europeans learnt certain things from their decade in the former Yugoslavia: the Bosnian wars produced the furrows into which the seeds of a wider, deeper and harder Common Foreign and Security Policy were planted, and for the subsequent creation of the European Security and Defence Policy. Tangible outcomes—from the European Rapid Reaction Force, the European Security Strategy, and the European Battlegroups, along with the new institutional architecture in Brussels—should ensure that we Europeans now have the capabilities to deal with similar disorder in the future. As such, the successful management of Kosovo’s independence might be considered as the culmination of what has been a difficult learning curve. But for those tools and policies to effectively be put into practice requires a coherent European stance to begin with. Unfortunately, that is the problem: Cyprus, Romania and Greece have continued to disagree with the common European line set down by London, Paris and Berlin, who are in turn supported by all remaining Member States.

The unhelpful approach to Kosovo taken by Cyprus and Greece raises issues concerning both Member States’ true allegiances. Mark Leonard, Director of the newly founded European Council on Foreign Relations, has accused them as being the ‘Trojan Horses’ for Russian interests in the European Union; that is to say, they often lean towards the Russian as opposed to the European approach on a range of issues, and veto European policy when the need arises. This is problematic at the best of times, but over the issue of Kosovo it is downright unacceptable. We cannot have certain Member States taking orders from foreign capitals, particularly when those capitals are increasingly arrogant, bellicose and working against our collective European interests.

On Kosovo, the Kremlin has taken an approach which is ‘fundamentally different’ to the positions of almost all of the Member States of the European Union. Russia is concerned that Kosovoan independence may set a precedent for those noisy groups in its soft underbelly, whom themselves desire independence from the Russian yoke. It is for this reason that Moscow flatly opposes any independence bid on the part of Kosovo. But this argument is flawed: European and American diplomats have been quite firm in stating that Kosovo is an exceptional case. The perception of Serbia in Kosovo is so bleak that artificially keeping the two communities together will sustain an unhappy marriage, which if left, will inevitably end in an ugly rather than a managed divorce.

Instead, what the Kremlin really fears is the fact that once the independence Kosovo becomes a reality, Russia’s remaining influence over the Western Balkans will be cracked open like a nut. As European power expands over both Kosovo—as a security provider—and Serbia—which will be left with no alternative other than a surge towards accession into its massive neighbour—the former Yugoslavia will gradually be engulfed by the European Union. As Europeans, we should welcome this: Russia, under the siloviki around Vladimir Putin, is no friend of ours. The country’s known and suspected behaviour towards the United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland, Norway, Georgia and Ukraine shows that Russia becomes more and more like a snarling bear with the passing of every week. This is amplified by Mr. Putin’s frequent diatribes against the West, whose language—as several British newspapers have pointed out—often invokes the ‘argot’ of a common ‘street-fighter’ instead of the eloquence generally expected from a head of state. Given mounting Russian hostility, Europeans should celebrate the removal of the Kremlin’s outposts from our own neighbourhood, and we should be implementing policies towards that end.

So what should the European Union do? First, and most obviously and importantly, the ‘Trojan Horses’ must stop being ‘Trojan Horses’. Cyprus, Romania and Greece must adhere to the common European approach set down by the British, French and Germans—and supported by everyone else—who, in any case, are the principal providers of the European Union’s foreign, security and defence capabilities.

Second, Brussels must prepare for a gradual transition towards full independence on the part of Prishtinë (the capital of Kosovo). This means that we must be willing to intervene robustly should violence break out after Kosovo gains control of its own future. If Serbian minorities come under renewed attack by extremists in the newly independent Kosovoan state, European Union armed forces must come to their aid. The upholding of order in the region is vital to our security and commercial expansion. That Brussels has prepared a preventative security force of 1,800 policemen, prosecutors and judges, ready to be sent to Kosovo on Saturday morning, will go some way in ensuring that the transition is peaceful. They will help the new Kosovoan government under the leadership of Hashim Thaçi settle down and bed in as the legitimate source of authority in the new country. This will also be something of a test of European resolve in the face of firm Russian opposition, and of European willingness to operate unilaterally outside of the United Nations (albeit with support from allies like the United States, Norway and Canada). As the European mission to Kosovo may not receive the United Nation’s formal blessing—due to the threat of a veto by the Kremlin—previous Security Council Resolutions may need to be ‘beefed up’ (otherwise known as distorted or spun) by Brussels in order to provide the mission with some semblance of legality under international law.

Finally, the European Union has to ensure that a long-term strategy is put in operation so that Serbia and Kosovo are absorbed into the European sphere of influence, as well as the wider Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. By electing the reformist pro-European Boris Tadić earlier this month, Serbs seem already to have chosen a European future over a Russian one. Europe must reward that decision appropriately, through aid and other forms of assistance, which might go some way in reducing Serbia’s upset at losing Kosovo.

Much rests on the next few weeks. Should we Europeans successfully manage Kosovo’s bid for independence, the peoples of the Western Balkans may finally be free to move into an age of reconciliation, and ready to put the horrors of the past behind them. If we succeed, a festering ulcer of instability will be healed, putting an end to one of the longest-running security threats to European prosperity. It is only through a robust and active approach on the part of the European Union that Kosovo, Serbia and the wider European homeland will be fused together in a common and democratic future.