Why both Europeans and Americans need a strong Europe

A couple of years ago, while I was the Director of the European Union research programme at The Henry Jackson Society, I wrote an article arguing that it was imperative that the European Union should become a ‘global power’, so that Europeans have the means to defend and extend their interests and values in the modern world. Robert Kagan, now thought to be the leading foreign policy advisor to John McCain, the Republican presidential hopeful in the United States, now seems to agree. As he put it, in the International Herald Tribune, three days ago:

To Euro-enthusiasts across the Continent, the new constitution was the answer to Europe’s malaise and the next step toward global leadership. But what now, since the treaty is dead?

All of this is bad news for the United States. In a world of rising great powers, of which two happen to be autocracies, the United States needs its fellow democracies to be as strong as possible.

A unified, independent, capable Europe is in American interests, even if we may disagree at times. I would much rather see Europe run the 21st century than Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Hu Jintao’s China.

The danger of this latest blow to European confidence is that America’s allies, including Britain, could gradually sink into global irrelevance.

He ends his article with the paragraph:

And perhaps Europe—the Europe lacking in leadership, the Europe now lacking a new treaty—is the way it is because that’s what the people really do want. If so, the 21st century, decidedly not run by Europe, will be a very tricky time for the United States.

So far from celebrating the weakness of the Europeans as he came close to doing in his seminal book Paradise and Power, Kagan now urges Europeans to become stronger, more confident and more integrated. A weak Europe is not in our interest, the interest of the United States, or the spread of constitutional government and human rights in foreign countries.

So I thought I would reproduce my original article for The Henry Jackson Society here, if only to remind any anti-Europeans of the reasons for why they are wrong:

A ‘Global Power Europe’: Why we need it

24th August 2006

The world in the twenty-first century is changing fast. New challenges, perhaps even to the very existence of Europe and the rest of the civilised world continue to grow at an alarming rate. When our leaders warn of an ‘arc of extremism’, they are not indulging in windy rhetoric or trying to scare us. The threats that the European Union and its allies face are both very real and very dangerous. Only last week was a terrorist plot thwarted in the United Kingdom that threatened to inflict mass murder on a scale possibly exceeding that of 11th September 2001. But global terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremists is only one of a series of strategic and security challenges now facing Europe; indeed, it may be a less important one. An amalgamation of the European Union’s expansion into the continent’s peripheries, the emergence of new centres of power in the world, combined with the threat of foreign policy apprehensiveness and a failure to the ‘will to power’ by Europeans demands new and radical action. To address these problems, what is required is for Europeans to work relentlessly to forge the European Union into a first-rate global power that will provide the weight and influence with which to shape the global environment into one more conducive to their values and interests.

Resources aplenty…

It is often conventional wisdom to accept that Europe’s heyday has been and gone. This is an inaccuracy of considerable proportions. After all, the European Union’s twenty-five states, when combined, still have formidable material resources at their disposal. The Union’s population of almost half a billion people creates a gross domestic product, according to Eurostat, of over €10.8 trillion (in 2005) – approximately €800 billion more than the United States – meaning that the bloc has by far the world’s largest economic output. Rapid economic growth in both the new accession states, and in the more liberal economies like Britain’s, means that the European economy can only continue to expand. Further, many European cities are at the vortex of the globalising economy. London, for example, is indisputably the planet’s dominant ‘world city’, with more economic exchange, foreign banks and multinational companies’ headquarters than any other city. Indeed, both London and Paris’ economies generate in excess of €600 billion per year, meaning that each has a bigger economy than many of the world’s richest industrial countries. London’s economy, for example, is comparable to those of Belgium, Russia and Sweden. What’s more, recent research suggests that this lead continues to grow.

Europe’s ideological and cultural attraction is also vast. Home of the development of the Magna Carta, the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the Rights of Man, parliamentary democracy, modernity and the process of regional integration, the continent has long been at the vanguard of progress and human innovation. European countries exert an enormous pull on other parts of the world, undoubtedly because of their spreading of European culture over the past five-hundred years during the Age of Exploration. English is the planet’s lingua franca, and numerous other European languages, from French to Spanish, are spoken in many of the world’s nations. The dynamism seen within the European democracies, moreover, in cinematic production, music, drama and the arts, has a positive impact on the rest of the globe. And European democracies—especially the established ones, like the United Kingdom and France—are a beacon of freedom and a model of civilisation to the rest of the world. Europe’s model of regional integration, moreover, holds out the prospect of the abolition of conflict throughout the continents of the world, and the spreading of a durable peace, underpinned by common values and lapped in universal law.

European military might is also strong. The United Kingdom and France have, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the second and third largest defence budgets in the world. If taken as a whole, while the European Union’s states spend approximately €170 billion on their armed forces, which, although less than half of America’s spending, is still more than all Asia and fourteen times more than all the countries of Africa combined. European states are the only others, bar the United States, that field ‘power projection’ capacities, able to be dispatched to almost anywhere in the world at short notice. The Royal Navy and the Marine nationale, are the only other navies, except the United States Navy, that possess aircraft carrier battlefleets, and both the Royal Air Force and the Armée de l’Air could utterly overwhelm any conceivable opponent. These forces are deployed across almost all of the Earth’s continents, in many of the world’s trouble spots, from Iraq and Afghanistan, to Congo and Sierra Leone. What’s more, these capabilities are set to increase: Britain, France and Italy are all planning or building larger aircraft carriers, while a new generation of warships and missile-firing submarines will be operational within the next decade. Finally, the European Union is effectively a nuclear power, under the shield of Britain and France’s strategic missile umbrella.

…but is there the will to use them?

Make no mistake, the European Union has the potential to be a top global power. But while Europeans have such formidable assets at their disposal there is a strong reluctance to unify in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy, which is further augmented by displays of a certain timidity in some European states, which, consequentially, causes divergences with the duties and obligations that come with being a global power. If foreign countries, and especially autocratic regimes, do not respect, let alone fear, the Europeans, their international clout will not match their material assets and their adversities will be emboldened, damaging European interests all over the world. Europeans must gain the will to turn up in diplomatic forums and say, when necessary: “We are the European Union, and we are willing to make things very difficult for you if you refuse to comply with our wishes.” What is required, then, is ‘global power’ thinking: an understanding across the whole Union that the European Union is becoming—and must be—a global power. Europeans should, therefore, adopt the aura of power and the willingness to discharge it. This consists of three components: firstly, to use power comprehensively, including the threat of, and, when necessary, use of, military force. Secondly, to forge and adopt a ‘Grand Strategy’ outlining Europe’s role in the world and the threats and challenges confronting the bloc in the twenty-first century. Of course, this must be pliable if circumstances of world order change, but there must be some kind of framework put in place for action. Thirdly, European power must be used progressively as a force for good in the world; there must be no ‘managing’ of the status-quo, but rather, a transformational approach to shape the global environment to Europe’s advantage: in other words, the construction of security through the diffusion of democracy, solidarity and the rule of law in other countries. Finally, Europeans must wholly combine their resources, with the ultimate aim of creating a fully-fledged global power, with a single integrated foreign, security and defence strategy, as well as the centralised institutions, armed forces and civilian services to support that strategy.

Since the closing years of the previous decade, Europeans have realised that the collective weight of the European Union is, potentially, far in excess of any individual European state’s influence, including even Britain and France. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac, frustrated with Europe’s inability to deal collectively with security threats even on the bloc’s own doorstep—specifically in the former Yugoslavia—started the process of European military integration at St. Malo in 1998. Since then, integration in the area of European foreign, security and defence strategy has evolved rapidly. The Laeken Declaration of 2001 asserted that the European Union must become a power rather than a player or actor, implying the need of military assets instead of purely civilian ones. The Constitutional Treaty, which is now dormant after the non and nee it received in referendums in France and the Netherlands, contained a ‘solidarity clause’ in the event of an attack on any European state (similar to NATO’s Article 5), and the European Security Strategy, adopted by the Brussels European Council of December 2003, sought to establish a shared understanding of the threats to European security. The fact that the strategy was a short, well-written, and precise document, crafted by Javier Solana, the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Policy (and formerly Secretary-General of NATO) and a team of strategists, including Robert Cooper, the Union’s Director-General for Politico-Military Affairs (and previously a key advisor to the British Premier, Tony Blair) meant that it had a lot of extra resonance. But above all, the aim of the European Security Strategy was to shape common European threat perceptions and encourage the Union’s states to work collectively in foreign, security and defence strategy. Another aim was to show Washington that the Europeans were serious about security and defence in the wake of the transatlantic fall-out over Iraq.

What threats and challenges face Europe?

The European Security Strategy pointed to five key threats confronting Europe in the early years of the twenty-first century:

• Terrorism, especially by Islamist extremists
• The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
• Regional conflicts, specifically in Europe’s neighbourhood, but also further a field
• State failure and bad governance
• Organised crime, like illegal drugs-trading and gun-running

The strategy also pointed to the problem of global warming and environmental change, as well as the role of globalisation in compressing space and time, leading to the likelihood of insecurity transcending state borders. Further, it linked the threats together, stating that many were mutually dependent. And yet, there was little acknowledgement of ‘threat depth’, meaning the level at which a challenge or threat originates. If one threat were dependent on the existence of another, it would be logical to target the deeper problem. For example, one cannot address the threat from weapons of mass destruction or Islamist extremists without tackling the structures in ineffectively governed states overseas that create them. Unfortunately, since 11th September 2001, there has been a tendency to elevate the challenge of global terrorism, when this is merely a symptom of a deeper set of problems, namely failed and ineffectively governed states. The strategy did, however, assert that ‘the first line of defence will often be abroad’, and called for a more preventative approach to European security and defence policy – yet more joined-up and comprehensive strategic thinking is still required.

At the same time, there has been a certain mismatch between European states in their pursuit of foreign, security and defence strategy. Iraq is of course a major example; Afghanistan, to a lesser extent, another. Whereas the British have been heavily active throughout the world in the past few years, France and Germany have not. In part, this is a consequence of structural factors: Germany has limited armed forces and an insufficient defence budget, which amounts to a paltry one and a half percent of its gross national product, whereas France has experienced economic and social difficulties in recent years. But also important is ‘global power’ thinking. Whereas Britain’s approach is more values-driven, assertive and confident, France and Germany appear to prefer a more ‘amoral-quietist’ approach to foreign affairs, which is compounded by a creeping and self-referential anti-Americanism.

Yet Gerhard Schröder’s trouncing in Germany’s federal elections in 2005 and the election of Angela Merkel as Chancellor seems to have put some oomph into German activities on the world stage. For example, Germany agreed to lead the European Union’s recent military operation in the Congo, which aimed to retain order and the rule of law during that nascent democracy’s elections. The Congo was explicitly outlined as an area requiring special European-level attention in the European Security Strategy, and German participation, let alone leadership, in the operation—from a country with little overseas military experience—is perhaps a testament to the strategy’s influence and success. As Europe’s prevailing strategic-military power, Britain has a special role to play in the development of European ‘global power’ thinking. Firstly, it must try and sweep away old-fashioned foreign policy thinking in other European states. Secondly, and more importantly, it should also seek to spread its progressive ‘global power’ approach to foreign, security and defence policy throughout the rest of Europe, diffusing it, above all, in Brussels.

‘Global power’ thinking by the European Union is essential for the protection of the bloc’s interests in a twenty-first century where large new competitors and potential adversities are rising simultaneously in several areas of the globe. China’s ascent is well acknowledged. India too is emerging as a major actor. America’s strength will also likely expand further still, especially if the country’s population grows, as projected, to perhaps as much as four-hundred-and-fifty million in the next five decades. But America is no threat to Europe, and nor is India, at least in a strategic sense. Both are economic competitors, undoubtedly, but democratic friends all the same. China’s rise, however, is more disturbing, as would be a potential resurgence of Russia or a more assertive Iran.

A major military threat from China to Europe and its allies’ existence is implausible, but Chinese economic competition could become a serious concern. A more severe threat from China will likely be its influence in other countries. China’s insatiable demand for energy and raw materials means, unlike the Western democracies, that it is more than willing to support and trade with unpalatable regimes, like Zimbabwe and the Sudan. Consider this statement, made by an academic at Wits University in South Africa: ‘If we deal with the United States or West European governments they would bring a list of thirty-three items requiring restructuring of your democracy, your human rights issues…China would arrive and say we accept you as you are. And that’s a refreshing change.’ Here, some might suggest that Europeans should operate similarly to the Chinese, doing deals with any dictator willing, but this must be resisted. After all, the supporting of strongmen leads to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, as witnessed in the Middle East. Rather, the Europeans and Americans must redouble their efforts to push for more democratic reform, and there must be consequences for those who attempt to interfere. And to states that seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons—like Iran—the response must be firm: no more autocracies can be allowed nuclear weapons, and any who try shall be stopped using all necessary means.

The need for a ‘Grand Strategy’

The twenty-first century world, then, is likely to be just as problematic as the world in the previous century. If Europe’s interests are to be upheld, how should it proceed with the development of the necessary strategic doctrine, institutional apparatus and instruments of influence? Self-evidently, the governments of the twenty-five European states must give up more power and build new and dynamic central institutions in Brussels. In this regard, a European Union ‘Ministry of External Affairs’ ought to be created and installed without delay. This should include three branches, headed by a European Union Minister for External Affairs, who in turn would advise the European Council, European Parliament and European Commission. The first branch would be a ‘European Security Council’, comprised of practitioners, military officials and academic historians, geographers and, crucially, grand strategists. The Security Council’s role would be to identify the strategic challenges and the more immediate threats to Europe’s security, while recommending the necessary course of remedial action. The second part of the Ministry would include a ‘European Defence Board’, whose responsibility would be to co-ordinate European armed forces and civilian personnel and the acquisition of military weaponry and other equipment, as well as the running of overseas operations. The Ministry of External Affairs’ third branch would be a Diplomatic Service, whose aim would be to take-over the role from the member-states of representing the European Union and its interests abroad. It is essential, however, in the interests of holism that the Ministry’s direction comes from the ‘Security Council’ and that the defence and diplomatic branches are coordinated under its direction. The Ministry’s role would be a combined department for foreign, security and defence policy and each area requires to be fully integrated. The Ministry’s ultimate role would be to implement a ‘Grand Strategy’ for the European Union, which would be crafted by the ‘Security Council’, outlining the bloc’s interests, policies and role in the wider world in the short, medium and longer-terms.

But what would a European Union ‘Grand Strategy’ include? Without a systematic study, conducted by the ‘European Security Council’, such a question is difficult to answer. Yet some themes might be readily identified for inclusion:

Firstly, and most importantly, would be values, which pave the way for interests. The promotion of European values—such as democracy, social solidarity, and strict adherence to the rule of law—must be at the heart of any ‘Grand Strategy’. The European Union is not a traditional Great Power, as it is founded on values and the desire for a durable peace between ancient nations. To give up those ideals would be to surrender the very premise that the Union is based upon, reducing its moral and ideational legitimacy. In other words, Europe’s internal practices must be reflected in the way that it conducts itself abroad. But this does not mean that the Union should treat every external actor similarly. No indeed, a great deal of the world beyond Europe is very much unlike the Union. Many parts are like a jungle, and, as one of Europe’s leading grand strategists says, ‘when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.’ In other words, Europeans must be prepared to get tough when the situation demands. And, as a global power with truly worldwide interests, as well as a missionary agenda to promote the values on which it is founded, the European Union will likely need to discharge its power quite frequently. Let us be clear: this does not contradict European values, for even within Europe’s domestic sphere, there is a policeman waiting behind every constitution in every democracy ready to use force to uphold the rule of law. If it acceptable to use force to uphold the law domestically, then the use of force externally, especially if it builds a better, more just, and peaceful world, cannot but also be sanctioned.

Secondly, and obviously, a ‘Grand Strategy’ must identify longer-term challenges and immediate threats to Europe’s security. Here, the European Security Strategy is a strong and steady start. It—or an updated version—can be incorporated into the ‘Grand Strategy’. What is essential, however, is to really look into the future and make projections for circumstances that may not be readily visible today. Had strategists foreseen the atrocities on 11th September 2001, the root causes in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East might have been addressed long ago. Other longer-term challenges might include environmental breakdown and energy dependence, a failure to invest in the palliatives needed to reduce global warming, the installation of weaponry in space by rival powers, or the mass-sabotage of information networks by viruses or computer hackers.

Thirdly, it is evident that Europeans attach a considerable importance to multilateralism and institutions that seek to bind the world together and address problems collectively. While it is often more efficient to work with other countries and institutions, Europeans must realise that there is frequently a marked difference between those institutions comprised only of democracies and those including also autocracies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, for example, are institutions including only democracies, whereas the United Nations is an institution with all manner of states, from mature democracies like the United Kingdom and Switzerland, to repressive states like Iran and Libya. That countries like Iraq could sit on the United Nations’ Disarmament Committee and Libya on the Human Rights Committee is undesirable for obvious reasons. Autocracies are the natural adversities of democracies, so the European Union has to treat them differently to democratic partners, and those institutions comprised only of democracies must, therefore, be elevated above those that do not. Here, the European Union might consider giving the global movement to create a Community of Democracies far more consideration and support.

Fourthly, a ‘Grand Strategy’ must also address the instruments needed for Europe to act in the wider world, both for now and for in the future. That a combination of military and civilian tools are crucial, is beyond dispute, but in what quantity and what order? The European Union may need to build up a large and efficient civilian service—of policemen, doctors, judicial executives, democracy monitors and human rights officials—to complement its military forces. The armed forces would need to be maintained as a technologically powerful force, meaning that military research and development would be essential to retain technological superiority over all plausible rivals. The ‘Grand Strategy’ would need, furthermore, to identify the level of spending required for external action, such as budgets for aid, the armed forces and civilian services. Without sufficient funding, overseas action will not reach its full potential.

Europe: from a peace project to a ‘global power’

Europeans have now a unique opportunity to reinforce their position as one of the world’s most dynamic and influential powers. The strengthening of the European Union with the full range of instruments, central institutions and strategic doctrine is essential for their acting in the wider world. In an era of deteriorating security in many of the planet’s regions and the emergence of new centres of power on many of the world’s continents, the Europeans’ failure to grasp the nettle and assume the position as a top global power will see their interests and values simultaneously undermined worldwide. Not only will this be to the detriment of their own global standing and ability to influence other societies, but would also likely reduce the positive impact elsewhere of one of history’s greatest pioneers of innovation. Further, global powers have special obligations and duties to discharge in the wider world, and are expected by their weaker partners to act as forces not only of international stability and security, but also as leaders on the global stage. Europeans must make their continental union a force for good in the world, and help to build and lead the world in the twenty-first century. This will be the result of a strong and confident European Union, a ‘global power’ Europe.

France’s strategic defence review: leading the debate

Guest article by Luis Simón Navarro

On Tuesday morning, President Nicolas Sarkozy presented in Paris a new strategy of security and defence for the next fifteen years, before an audience of some 3500 people, including military officials, police officers, diplomats and other civil servants, experts and journalists. The publication of France’s Livre Blanc pour la défense et la sécurité nationale comes at an appropriate moment: a good six months before the expiration of Javier Solana’s deadline to come up with a revision of the European Security Strategy, only two weeks before France’s takeover of the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, and at the very early stages of the deliberations aimed at providing NATO with a new Strategic Concept—expected next year in the Alliance’s sixtieth anniversary summit, to be held in Strasbourg and Kehl. A new American administration will be in place by January 2009 and the European Union seems on track (Dublin forbid) for giving itself the necessary instruments—mainly in the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy—to tackle the challenges of the twenty-first century more coherently, robustly and effectively.

Indeed, it is a good time for strategic reflection. For one thing, the hindsight of time, and the (ongoing) lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, have contributed to a better understanding of the nature of the new puzzles that arose from the smoke of the Islamist attacks on 11th September 2001. Furthermore, the current instability in financial markets—partly rooted in the important disruptions in the chain of global energy supplies—and the, largely related, alterations in the European and global balances of power (i.e. the resurgence of Russia or the rise of Asia) are notable developments that deserve careful strategic reflection.

France’s new Livre Blanc replaces a previous strategy from 1994, and provides a guiding framework for the country’s foreign, security and defence policy over the next fifteen years. The deepening of globalisation and subsequent growing interdependence, resulting in rapid and considerable transformations in the strategic environment, are highlighted throughout the new strategy. Arguably, one of the most noticeable features of the Livre Blanc is the absence of a cut-clear, one-stop threat to the security of France and its allies. Instead, the density of the current strategic landscape derives from the coexistence of the new post-Cold War, post-11th September threats with the kind of old challenges from which Europeans thought they had moved away only fourteen years ago.

Particularly alarming is the emphasis placed on Europe’s relative decline in international affairs, a decline illustrated by a substantial shift in global geopolitical and economic attention towards Asia or the challengingly growing protagonism of Russia on the European scene. Today and tomorrow’s challenges are inherently entwined and multidimensional: a blurring distinction between the internal and external dimensions of security; the evil triangle of terrorism, failed states and weapons of mass destruction proliferation; energy scarcity (a challenge whose European dimension the document particularly emphasises); organised crime; threats to cyber security; the emergence of global pandemics; and the advance of global warming.

According to Louis Gautier, the defence advisor to former French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, and national delegate for strategic affairs in the Socialist Party, the Livre Blanc feeds a narrowly conceived paradigm of the world, one dominated by the West’s fears. As he says, in this mindset, ‘international security will result from arms superiority, the effectiveness of protection systems and the unity of the West.’[1] Regrettably, Gautier contends, the spirit of the Livre Blanc propels a pessimistic attitude: alternative options such as the promotion of multilateral schemes for disarmament or the strengthening of international regulation simply do not qualify as credible means for delivering French security. This emerging paradigm is not just a consequence of the growing disillusion with dreams such as The end of History, but is also a source for uploading suspicion and lack of confidence into the international system over the years to come. This is the ‘security dilemma’ in action.

For the Livre Blanc, the world’s growing volatility calls out for a flexible strategy: entwined and multidimensional challenges require comprehensive solutions. It says that more coherence is needed between military, diplomatic, economic and other civilian means, but also between and among partners, the various regional and international organisations or other elements of global civil society. The Livre Blanc proclaims prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention as France’s core strategic functions. Particularly recurring is the theme of prevention and the corresponding emphasis on the acquisition and distribution of information—a concept the French used to refer to as intelligence. It is in this sense that we can understand the substantial budgetary increase in the field of satellite communications and other space-based assets—from the current figure of €380 million to over €700 million in the next few years.

Possible concerns with a potential activation of more traditional (inter-state) conflicts are well covered by the continuing accent on independent nuclear deterrence—the ultimate guarantee of France’s protecion. Finally, the ongoing globalisation of security challenges puts a premium on attributes such as deployability and readiness; on intervention. This explains the envisaged reductions of personnel—a cut of 54,000 over the next six to seven years—and assets restructuring in the armed forces (i.e. rationalisation of military facilities in French territory). The direct target behind the restructuring is to reverse the current ratio—sixty percent of the French defence budget and assets are devoted to logistics and maintenance and forty percent to operational punch—in order to close the gap with Britain’s armed forces, were those figures are reversed. Finally, the absence of a decision over the construction of a second aircraft carrier for the Marine nationale is perhaps the most notable news in the realm of capabilities.

The Livre Blanc identifies a ‘geographic axis of strategic priority’, namely the strategic corridor that connects the Euro-Atlantic space with the Indian Ocean. The new geographic axis runs from metropolitan France, through the Mediterranean and the Gulf, and on into the Indian Ocean. Special importance is also given to Western and sub-Saharan Africa, areas in which the French have traditionally played an active role and remain currently engaged. Such an explicit reference to a strategic geographic axis represents, arguably, a step backwards from a (alleged) prior global focus that today seems financially unattainable. Most significantly, the new French strategy seems to ignore Latin America, as well as the same Asia that the document catalogues as the strategic locus of the twenty-first century.

France’s ‘Geographic Axis of Strategic Priority’

Regarding France’s vociferated reintegration into NATO’s military structure, the new strategy puts emphasis on the fact that the announced move is just part of a wider pattern of cooperation between France and NATO that goes back to the early-mid 1990s. Such a pattern is best illustrated by France’s return to the Alliance’s military committee in 1996, or Paris’ active participation in NATO missions.[2] Unsurprisingly, not everyone is happy: it is this very issue that the French Socialists have attacked, given the scepticism that the noises of a comeback triggers both within France’s administration and the country’s public opinion at large.

Last and, most certainly, not least is l’Europe. Europe and the European Union play a pivotal role throughout the Livre Blanc, for which it is almost impossible to conceive a French strategy without a European strategy. The document pays special tribute to the historical character of the Franco-German couple as the driving force behind European integration, but also points to the Franco-British connection as an indispensable asset in the road towards the consolidation of the European Union as an international power and security provider.

Down at the level of specifics, the document advances, in a rather raw form, some of President Sarkozy’s ambitious proposals for the further development of European Security and Defence Policy: first, the need to boost Europe’s autonomous capabilities for effective crisis management (including the creation of a Permanent Headquarters in Brussels for the planning and command of European operations); second, the creation of a European strategic reserve force of some 60,000 personnel with the required naval and aerial components; third, a reinforcement of the mechanisms for common funding for European operations; fourth, the establishment of European schemes for training military and civilian personnel; fifth, the rationalisation of Europe’s defence industry; sixth, an expansion of the Union’s functions in the realm of security beyond crisis management, such as common defence (notably strengthening the internal dimension of European security); and finally, the call for a European Defence White Book. Interesting times certainly await Europeans with France’s upcoming presidency of the European Union!

[1] Le Monde, 19th June 2008 (own translation).
[2] On France’s relationship with NATO after the end of the Cold War see: Frédéric Bozo, ‘Alliance atlantique: la fin de l’exception française?’, Document de Travail (Paris: Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique), February 2008.

Luis Simón Navarro, EFSPS Scholar, is completing his Ph.D. in French and European defence policy at Royal Holloway, University of London. He is currently a guest researcher at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris.

The Last Days of Europe?

Anti-Europeanism in the United States, like anti-Americanism in Europe, has a rich history. But whereas European anti-Americanism seems motivated, paradoxically, by a lurid self-loathing, perhaps American disdain for the ‘Old World’ is motivated by something different. Americans have long predicted the eclipse of Europeans, often relishing the prospect. In 1816, for example, Thomas Jefferson, one of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of the United States, stated in a letter to John Quincy Adams:

Old Europe will have to lean on our shoulders, and to hobble along by our side, under the monkish trammels of priests and kings, as she can.

Nearly two-hundred years later, in 2006, Walter Laqueur, the well-known American historian, was writing the manuscript for his new book: The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent. This is what he said in his book’s concluding paragraphs:

[The]...picture of Europe in the first decade of the new century...is a picture of gradual decline that offers little comfort to Euro-optimists. Future historians may well be at a loss to understand why the sorry state of affairs was realised only late in the day, despite the fact that all the major trends...—demography, the stalling of the movement toward European unity, and the crisis of the welfare state—had happened well before the turn of the century.

He went on:

The decline of the Roman empire has been discussed for centuries and it could well be that the discussion about the decline of Europe will last as long. Why was it ignored for so long? In part, this could be explained as the result of the fixation of Europe on America—America as a model and as a deterrent, America as a rival, opponent, and ally—at the cost of ignoring the rest of the world. But there must have been other causes, and they will be discussed for a long time to come. There are many fascinating problems. Was the decline perhaps inevitable? Was it reversible? If so, at what stage did it become irreversible?

Decline often proceeds not as quickly as feared; there are usually retarding circumstances. But it is also true that, for better or worse, the pulse of history is beating quicker in our times than in the Middle Ages.

There is a danger, after the threats to Europe have been neglected for so long, of throwing up our hands in despair and accepting with resignation its future role as a museum of world history and civilisation preaching the importance of morality in world affairs to a non-existent audience.

Decline offers challenges that ought to be taken up even if there is no certainty of success...The age of delusions is over.

Clearly, in rejecting the Treaty of Lisbon, the Irish are still trapped in Laqueur’s ‘age of delusions’. It may be the case that the Irish government put up a poor campaign to encourage their citizens out to vote ‘yes’, and that a ragbag gaggle of reactionaries and other oddities hijacked the vote by spreading myths, but the problem is deeper and more pervasive. Like Morcock’s ‘Dancers at the End of Time’, Ireland lives in a bubble, rich and seemingly secure, but, along with so many other Europeans, unable to see the challenges of the future: the re-emergence of great power competition, Islamism, global warming, and so on. The wealth unleashed by European technology and integration—and the open, global economy, on which we have constructed and now all depend—has made us strategically and politically impoverished. Pacifism and sloppy internationalism have crept in, and clouded many a European judgement. The outcome is a naïve belief in ‘peace’, ‘isolationism’, ‘neutrality’, or some such, leaving the Americans and other Europeans, not least the British and French, to provide security and protection for everyone else.

But Laqueur is only partially right. Europeans are not so much in decline, for they still have the choice to implement the reforms to remain relevant, prosperous and strong. However, an alternative future could be one where Europeans commit suicide. This will be accompanied by anxiety and a growing feeling of helplessness—which may already be emerging. In order to reverse this trend, we need bold leaders to sort out the constitutional mess of contemporary Europe, leaders ready to transcend petty national differences and work together in the only community and framework with the potential power to recapture popular imaginations and loyalties: the European Union. Here, it is critical that the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, presses ahead with the Treaty of Lisbon’s ratification, which he and his government have rightfully pledged to do. The Irish vote does not mean the treaty is dead yet; if the other twenty-six Member States ratify the treaty, we might be in a position to ask Ireland to vote again, implement the treaty’s articles through other means, or even ask Ireland to leave the Union.

If the project of European unification is blocked, our great continent—represented by monuments of unequalled scale; great ideas and ideologies; profound scientific breakthroughs and social innovations; and an unquenchable thirst for knowledge—will surely be pulled apart. A consequence would be that our enemies and other reactionaries would rejoice, whilst jumping up and down in celebration of Europe’s marginalisation and dismemberment. And what would be the greatest travesty of all? It would be that it was all our own fault—or at least Ireland’s.