David Miliband says ‘no’ to a European superpower
When a friend sent me a link to this article in The Guardian yesterday morning, I must confess that I got very excited. The newspaper reported that David Miliband, the British foreign secretary, was to present a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, outlining the need for the European Union to develop the full spectrum of military capabilities to intervene in foreign conflicts as and when necessity dictated. Speaking of Mr. Miliband’s proposed arguments, The Guardian put it like this:In a speech setting out the direction of Europe over the next two decades, he will warn the EU faces “a fork in the road”, and risks falling back into an age of disorder if it makes the wrong choices, including rejecting the use of hard military power...He will also make a strong case in favour of the EU retaining support for the principle of hard power, through the use of economic influence and military intervention abroad.
For anyone not yet aware, ‘hard power’ is the capacity to coerce and threaten, literally to impose one’s will on others. It is the opposite of ‘soft power’, which is the ability to attract other societies or people to one’s cause without needing to force anyone into doing anything. For example, ‘hard power’ can include airstrikes, military intervention, economic sanctions and diplomatic coercion, whereas ‘soft power’ includes the ability to woo people with culture, financial inducements and diplomatic recognition. Both concepts were developed by the American political scholar, Joseph Nye, in his books Bound to Lead, The Paradox of American Power and Soft Power. Unfortunately, many politicians and scholars—who should know better—often now use the terms altogether too frequently, sometimes in the wrong context, or simply inappropriately.
Having now read Mr. Miliband’s speech, this criticism cannot be applied to him; like Tony Blair, the former prime minister, the foreign secretary seems to have a good grasp of when either term should or can be applied. Other than getting the differences between the two alleged forms of power right, Mr. Miliband also made a number of timely and useful contributions to the ongoing debate over the shape of British and European Union foreign policy in the twenty-first century. As he put it:
My argument is this:
The prospects and potential for human progress have never been greater. But our prosperity and security are under threat. Protectionism seeks to stave off globalisation rather than manage it. Religious extremists peddle hatred and division. Energy insecurity and climate change threaten to create a scramble for resources. And rogue states and failing states risk sparking conflicts, the damage of which will spill over into Europe.
These threats provide a new raison d’être for the European Union. New because the unfinished business of internal reform to update our economic and social model is on its own not enough to engage with the big issues, nor the hopes and fears, of European citizens. For the EU because nation-states, for all their continuing strengths, are too small to deal on their own with these big problems, but global governance is too weak. So the EU can be a pioneer and a leader. Our single market and the standards we set for it, the attractions of membership, and the legitimacy, diversity and political clout of twenty-seven member states are big advantages. The EU will never be a superpower, but could be a model power of regional cooperation.
For success, the EU must be open to ideas, trade and people. It must build shared institutions and shared activities with its neighbours. It must be an Environmental Union as well as a European Union. And it must be able to deploy soft and hard power to promote democracy and tackle conflict beyond its borders. As Gordon Brown said on Monday there is no longer a distinction between ‘over there’ and ‘over here’.
So there we have it: The threats brought about by globalisation—that is, the compression of space and time, and at an increasing tempo—have introduced a new set of dynamics for all of us to deal with. Such dynamics include processes of migration, Islamist terrorism and organised crime, and so on. Others, which were alluded to in latter parts of his speech, included the rise of China and India, as well as the aggressiveness of a resurgent Russia, and the challenges these three countries might pose to we Europeans by 2030. In order to address such threats, the British foreign secretary argued that the European Union should take a far larger role in preventative intervention and the enhancement of our armed forces:
European Member States must improve their capabilities. It’s embarrassing that when European nations—with almost two million men and women under arms—are only able, at a stretch, to deploy around one-hundred thousand at any one time. EU countries have around 1,200 transport helicopters, yet only about thirty-five are deployed in Afghanistan. And EU Member States haven’t provided any helicopters in Darfur despite the desperate need there.
European nations need to identify the challenges we face; the capabilities we consequently need; then identify targets for national investment in equipment, research, development, and training necessary to make more of our armed forces; work together for efficiency; and back it up with political drive...
Perhaps conceding some of the mistakes made after the Iraq War, Mr. Miliband went on:
As the prime minister set out earlier this week, military forces should be deployed on peacekeeping duties with civilian crisis management experts as an integral part of the operation. There is limited value in securing a town if law and order breaks down as soon as the troops move on. There is limited gain in detaining terrorists and criminals if there is no courthouse to try them in or jailhouse to hold them in. Security without development will soon alienate local populations. Development without security is impossible. They are two sides of the same coin.
Finally, the foreign secretary said that we Europeans must not react to events, but actively seek to shape them:
We must use our power and influence, not just to resolve conflict, but prevent it. We must show we are prepared to take a lead and fulfil our responsibilities.
And yet, alongside the productive arguments made by Mr. Miliband, one stands out like the sharpest of thorns. This was his assertion that the European Union shall never become a superpower. This is surprising, for it actively moves against the statements of Tony Blair, who said that the European Union should become a superpower, if not a superstate. To some extent, it also contradicts the speeches made by the European Union’s foreign policy High Representative, Javier Solana, who has continued to argue—at times quite insistently—that the European Union has got to become a fully-fledged global power if it is to make real on its foreign policy desires and commitments. Many other European leaders have also stated that they want the European Union to be able to project power in order to defend and extend European values and interests. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, can certainly be counted among their ranks; he has already claimed that European military integration will be one of his most important priorities once France assumes the role of the presidency of the Council of the European Union next year. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that any single European Union Member State, even Britain or France, will have the aggregated weight and authority to deal as equals with the potential great powers of tomorrow—which Mr. Miliband alluded to himself.
Instead of a superpower in its own right, the foreign secretary seems to advocate that the European Union become some form of ‘model power of regional cooperation’. Perhaps this is just a bit of dumbed-down and unthreatening rhetoric, designed to placate the rabidly Eurosceptic media in the United Kingdom. Or perhaps there is something more to it. Indeed, if this were the case, the idea of Europe becoming a model for the rest of the world to follow chimes nicely with an ongoing academic debate, instigated in part by Professor Ian Manners, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. He suggests that the European Union is a ‘normative power’, which uses the examples it sets for itself as a means to encourage other countries into accepting its ways. Prof. Manners looks specifically at Brussels’ numerous attempts to get capital punishment abolished in foreign lands, using diplomatic pressure and economic inducements. Of course, we should all applaud the spread of European values, for they are certainly more advanced and enlightened than practically anything else on offer. But it is simply insufficient for us to rely on our values to uphold our position of power and authority—let alone our security—in the wider world, particularly if potentially hostile regimes emerge on our borders, or even in other continents where we have extensive commercial and geopolitical interests.
So it is not possible for a political community the size of the European Union to remain only a ‘model’ or ‘normative’ power. As David Miliband himself argued, our interests are truly global in scope; events in the most far-away lands will eventually have some kind of impact at home, whether it be from chaos in certain provinces in Afghanistan, government corruption in Africa or South America, or the build-up of Chinese naval ambitions around South East Asia and the Strait of Malacca—through which one quarter of European maritime trade flows. This means that it is impractical for the European Union not to also evolve into a global power, for failure to do so will lead to our eclipse, and our reduction into a weak and divided power in the wider world. The corollary of this is that our values and normative desires will count for less, and we shall lose the ability to enforce them or to encourage their adoption. After all, there is nothing incompatible between ‘model’ or ‘normative’ and superpower status; indeed, it could be said that each depends on the other, in a fundamentally reciprocal relationship.

11 comments:
Don't you think Miliband used the 'not a superpower' line as a sop to British eurosceptics? The British press is unlikely to look at the specifics of the speech, yet his one-liner about not a superpower might help get some decent press?
Can you imagine Jack Straw or Margaret Beckett giving a speech like that?
James Rogers, thank you for your enhanced version of the speech, which I suppose is along the lines the ECFR is going to promote.
Dear Jon: Thanks for your response. There is some merit in what you say, and I think I said that it could be a possibility somewhere in the article. Indeed, it seems that a more reluctant Gordon Brown ordered Mr. Miliband to change the speech, removing all the substance and the interesting parts. This report in The Times no doubt hypes the whole affair too much, but it does seem to reflect the differences between The Guardian’s report and the actual speech. I think the foreign secretary had the right approach: security, foreign policy and defence are the most powerful arguments that can be made for the furthering of European integration. British politicians must make this case, and should stop hiding from the anti-European, often foreign owned, media in the United Kingdom.
Interesting blog,
I don't see how the EU in it current form could be a superpower, maybe it should be one, but a superpower needs to be able to react quickly to an event, and the current EU still has many conflicting interests, veto's or other ways to delay decisions.
Also I think the public opinion, not just in the UK but pretty much everywhere is a lot less pro-eu than 10 years ago, so I don't see it happening.
ps. Why do British foreign secretaries always hold big European speeches in Bruges? Maybe because there's less eurosceptic press there, or because of the college of Europe? Just wondering since I live close to this city.
"And yet, alongside the productive arguments made by Mr. Miliband, one stands out like the sharpest of thorns. This was his assertion that the European Union shall never become a superpower... Instead of a superpower in its own right, the foreign secretary seems to advocate that the European Union become some form of ‘model power of regional cooperation’. Perhaps this is just a bit of dumbed-down and unthreatening rhetoric, designed to placate the rabidly Eurosceptic media in the United Kingdom."
Perhaps not. Might it not be the case that Mr Miliband has grasped a fundamental political truth and which he knows not only Herculean to sell to the British electorate but more importantly something of a Utopian dream? That is to say, is not possible that he is cognisant of the fact that for the EU to be a proper superpower (able to compete in all areas of power projection with (principally) the US, and the potential Great Powers we now call the BRICS) the ontology of the EU has to cease from being the European consortium it now is and become a superstate that, ultimately, subordinates all the states in the EU milieu and thereby monopolises the legitimate use of violence in all member countries?
The really important question to be debated is thus not the irrelevant debate on whether the EU is a species of 'normative power' (as, for instance, in contradistinction from a 'hard power'*): but, 'Is it really possible for the EU to be a superpower without having a superstate to rival, say the Americans and the Chinese?'. Personally, i think not. And i think this is what Miliband understands and hence his correct assertion that the EU will not be a superpower.
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*It is a comment on the poor analytical skills of the debaters in the so-called 'normative power' versus 'hard power' debates that they imagine the two are, strictly speaking, extricable and can go it alone, as it were. But this kind of approach is a species of a logical/conceptual fallacy (i.e., 'category mistake', as Ryle termed it) that the philosopher Ryle accused Descartes of engaging in when the latter came up with mind-body dualism. It imagines (or divvies a phenomena or phenomenon) as being better understood as distinct concepts that are in polar opposition. So that in our case: power is divided into, say, normative and military powers. The upshot then becomes such that the two are interpreted as being different in the sense that they are now ascribed with different organising principles and working dynamics. But the fallacy here, as the Americans discovered (and indeed are discovering) in Iraq, is that so-called normative power, just as with the mind and the body, is INEXTRICABLY linked with hard power, and vice versa. One cannot function without the other, strictly speaking. Is it any coincidence that the greatest contemporary military power (the US) key cultural, economic and political values (democracy and the free market, principally; or as Fukuyama puts it, 'democratic-capitalism') are more or less the idee recue of the age? One could pretty much say the same about British Pax. And indeed ditto with the Roman Pax.
Dear Ced: I agree; the European Union in its current form cannot be a superpower. The best it can be is a regional influence, but to be a power it will need functional command structures, armed forces at least as powerful as Britain and France’s combined, and more centralisation of power in Brussels. That was my problem with Miliband’s speech: It was not so much that there wasn’t any vision, but rather than the steps required for that vision to be realised were not articulated.
I think only two British politicians have used Bruges to give speeches on the Union: Margaret Thatcher and David Miliband. I assume Bruges is chosen because of the College of Europe, and I suspect Miliband also chose it to reduce its association with Mrs. Thatcher’s paranoid Europhobia.
Dear Hamjatta: I see absolutely no reason why the European Union cannot or should not become a political union, which has the sole authority to wield violence within its territorial jurisdiction. To accept that the geopolitical space we call contemporary Europe will now remain eternal and unchanged is not only absurd but also peculiar. Europe’s geopolitical make-up has evolved almost perpetually since records began. The difference now is that time-space relations have moved the struggles and competitions out of Europe and onto a global level.
As such, political logic would suggest that as large non-European powers rise around the European Union—such as the so-called BRICS, to which you allude—two things will happen. First, the ‘logic of equivalence’ should kick in, which will create a differential/antagonistic boundary between ‘us’ (that is, Europeans) and ‘them’ (everyone else). Second, but nevertheless, simultaneously, a ‘logic of difference’ will come into operation, and will reduce all previous differential/antagonistic identities within Europe (e.g. British, French, German, and so on) into an equivalence (e.g. European). This is the way political communities are formed, and it applies as much to the construction of France and Britain as it does to the German Empire and the United States.
But I’m completely with you on the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power issue. They cannot be detached, and that is what I said in my article!
James,
I am glad you clarified your position and now appear to concede my point that the EU cannot be a superpower in its current ontological form and that to become a superpower it has to be come a quintessential Weberian modern state with all the attributes thereof.
Whilst you recognise this fundamental political point and stated your preference for this (i.e., a preference for a European super-state), you appear now to hinge your argument about European superpowerhood on the idea that a common European identity would eventually emerge in years to come that would transcend the old identities (for instance, German , British, French, etc.) and make the creation of a European superstate a matter of historical necessity. You seem to think that this change will happen principally because the rise of the BRICS would incentivise the Europeans to galvanise and group together in the face of the threat posed by these new powers and/or centres or power.
But even so, one rather suspects that the EU is still unlikely to become a superstate or a superpower despite the rise of the BRICS and the subsequent global distribution of power. I forward two reasons for this.
First, so far as one can tell, most Europeans do not fear the rise of the BRICS to the degree that they see them as potential existential risks to their civlisation. That is to say, most Europeans recognise the challenges posed by the rise of the BRICS but they do not infer an existential moment, crisis or threat from this. At best (or worst, as the case may be), they think of this as a challenge; but not a challenge that warrants the adding of adjectives like 'existential'. And that position is entirely sensible. The challenge of the BRICS, such as it is, is merely in their backyards: that is, they will at some point make moves that will marginalise the influence or meddling of the Western powers in their backyards. So that the REAL (as opposed to the theoretical possibilities) threats they pose to the Western powers are simply regional. I cannot see why Europeans would think of this challenge as an imperative for them to dismantle their different national polities/states in order to stop China from dominating its backyard.
Second, i happen to believe that we are increasingly moving towards an era in world politics where not only would we have different centres of powers, i.e., hyper- multipolarity; but more importantly - and this might be a historical novelty - for the first in the modern era we might be witnessing the end of the world of superpowers. At best, we are moving towards an era when no major power will be a true global hegemon - the US may very well be the world's last such hegemon or superpower. This is not to say that Great Powers would not make attempts to be global hegemons or that their interests and efforts will fail to materialise globally; it is simply to say that superpowerhood, that is to say, the attributes a TRUE global hegemon has, would be unrealisable because of current geopolitical and normative shifts that are still being contoured.
Hamjatta
Hamjatta: On the need for a European superpower/superstate, I haven’t conceded anything to you as that has always been my own position. Assisting with the creation of such a European federation has always been the purpose of this blog!
Now, regarding your first point, I think to some extent that you make a valid assessment. The rise of new powers does not pre-determine Europeans to group together under a new political formation (the European Union). But this is the part where agency and advocacy comes in. It is a profound mistake to believe that the rise of China and India will not have enormous impact on existing European national identities or sovereignty. If we accept that the exercise of power is merely repression, then the rise of new powers will dislocate pre-existing European national identities and alter them in potentially fundamental ways. Whether or not this becomes apparent to Europeans is of course another matter entirely. But let us assume that it does start to get recognised. China’s economic penetration has already been realised, just as Russia’s aggressive resurgence has damaged European economic and energy interests in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. What then?
It will be as this moment when we will start to see greater pushes across Europe for a more coherent and potent European Union. The rise of pan-European advocacy groups, the emergence of powerful lobbying groups in Brussels, and the creation of European foreign and defence policy think tanks and other advocacy groups is surely to some extent evidence of that? And the constant chatter, even if more rhetorical than physical, on the need for the European Union to become a foreign policy and military actor would also suggest that changes are afoot? And that they’re coming from Britons and Frenchmen, who are historically well-versed in exercising global power surely adds to that assessment? Granted, the potential for the suffocation of such changes at birth is altogether too real, but this I think calls for even greater pressure for the constitution of a European political entity.
With regards to your second point, I think you’re fundamentally mistaken. From a cursory historical reading—even of the last century—it would seem that the most unstable periods and revolutionary changes are not when we have either a system of relatively balanced multipolarity (e.g. the Bismarckian system in late nineteenth century Europe), a nuclear bipolar system (e.g. Cold War) or even a unipolar system (1991-2001), but when we have a system where great powers struggle against one another for (dwindling) resources, land, power and primacy (e.g. the early twentieth century). I believe that mounting evidence suggests that this is the world that we are about to enter, and from a European perspective, it makes the need for a stronger and more powerful European Union even greater.
“On the need for a European superpower/superstate, I haven’t conceded anything to you as that has always been my own position. Assisting with the creation of such a European federation has always been the purpose of this blog!”
The point is: you have never conceded (or admitted) – except sotto voce - that for the EU to become a superpower its current consortium-like ontology has give way to a modern State ala Weber – nay, a superstate that subordinates all the states in the geopolitical milieu of the EU. At best, all you do in your advocacy of the transformation of the EU as a superpower is to say you are in favour of a “European federation”, which is of course merely a euphemism for saying you are in favour of a EUropean superstate.
“It is a profound mistake to believe that the rise of China and India will not have enormous impact on existing European national identities or sovereignty.” (Your italics)
Yes, precisely in what way? Can you be more specific?
“If we accept that the exercise of power is merely repression, then the rise of new powers will dislocate pre-existing European national identities and alter them in potentially fundamental ways.”
But this is the wrong way to conceptualise power: above all, power is to defend, protect and advance. It may degenerate into repression and mere brute force; but that is just that - degeneration. In other words, power is best understood as a tool that is used to get what you want but could not otherwise have done through persuasion. Of course, ultimately, the ultima ratio of power is the projection of violence; but violence is NOT synonymous with repression.
Your contention that “the rise of new powers will dislocate pre-existing European national identities and alter them in potentially fundamental ways” is based on a faulty supposition. You’re supposing that the likes of China and India have interests that go beyond the pragmatic one of controlling their immediate milieu or even their ‘near abroad’. But how accurate is this in portraying Chinese intentions or even those of India’s? I am deeply sceptical. Consider: Insofar as one can tell, at worst, the Chinese have no territorial and/or hegemonial interests outside their immediate milieu or (in extremis) outside of Asia. Of course, the Chinese (like all aspiring Great Powers) have global interests not least of which is finding cheaper sources of energy. But these are being pursued in a non-territorial sense but through the Realkpolitik of economic diplomacy that eschews considerations on the nature of the regime in a particular. But this is going to backfire at some point and in any case the relationship therein is fragile and tenuous and not as hegemonic as we would expect of hegemonial-peripheral relations. We could pretty much say the same about the Indians.
I however grant you that Russia potentially poses a threat that can galvanise opinion in Europe to bandwagon towards a more integrated EU; but it seems to me that the reason why the Russian bear is currently growling and spoiling for a fight with the West is as much to with Russian authoritarianism and the ineptitude Western diplomacy. The reality is that the West has not handled relations with Russia quite well and, in some cases, has acted quite ineptly actually. To be sure, the Russian bear could become more dangerous especially if the alliance with China becomes fatally joined to the hip; but I do not see why this is unmanageable within the existing framework of Western security. That is, NATO still works and can be recalibrated to deal with that threat scenario from a Russia formally and fatally allied with China.
“From a cursory historical reading—even of the last century—it would seem that the most unstable periods and revolutionary changes are not when we have either a system of relatively balanced multipolarity (e.g. the Bismarckian system in late nineteenth century Europe), a nuclear bipolar system (e.g. Cold War) or even a unipolar system (1991-2001), but when we have a system where great powers struggle against one another for (dwindling) resources, land, power and primacy (e.g. the early twentieth century). I believe that mounting evidence suggests that this is the world that we are about to enter, and from a European perspective, it makes the need for a stronger and more powerful European Union even greater.”
I think you misunderstood me. By stating that the world is going to become more multipolar and even hyper multipolar, I was not arguing the desirability (or otherwise) of such a world but was simply stating a fact. Be that as it may, which system (multipolar, bipolar, unipolar, etc.) is more prone to Great Power wars and crises is really a matter of historical contingency. One recalls that Waltz wrote at great length (Mearsheimer et al unthinkingly followed him) that a bipolar world is more stable (see Waltz ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus, Vol. 93, No 3, pp. 8981-901, 1964; but compare with William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’ International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 5-41, 1999). But as the likes of Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out to the neorealists, a bipolar can be equally prone to major wars, especially if it contains satellite states (or allies) who have the capacity to drag – unwillingly – the Great Powers into a hegemonic war. The Peloponnesian War was a historical instancing of this observation. In sum, whether the emerging hyper multipolar world ends up being prone to Great Power conflicts/wars is really a matter of historical and other contingencies; that is, this cannot be stated a priori or with any confidence. It is mere speculation to say that the world of hyper multipolarity is going to be a more violent world or simply more prone instances of Great Power conflict and crises.
If I am correct in my hypothesis, that is, that the world that is to come is going to be a hyper multipolar world, then it should follow, ex hypothesis, that such a world would not be a world of superpowers but a world of many Great Powers who lack the capacity to be global hegemons. At best, insofar as it is still possible to think of the emerging structure of worlds in terms of hegemons, we are more likely to see continental hegemons rather than global ones. We may very well be witnessing the end of the era of superpowers; that is, we may be entering a period in modern history when the world would lack global hegemons or superpowers. The US may very well be the last superpower. It is in connection with this thought that I also posited the EU would not be a future superpower.
Hamjatta
Dear Hamjatta: To argue that the European Union requires armed forces and central structures to exercise effective political control—or indeed, that it should become a federation—is as good as saying that it should acquire the tools and characteristics of a State. But if you need me to be thoroughly explicit: I want the Union to gain the capabilities of a State, albeit in federal form, with Member States taking care of their social and cultural systems, but with Brussels dealing with foreign, security and defence policy. A number of other political and economic issues would be shared between the two.
I disagree with you on the character of power. The effect of power is always repression. This does not exclude the possibility of there being different forms of power (instrumentality). In fact, I would advance that there are two forms of power: violence and authority. But both merely repress in the first instance. However—and this is important—through being repressive, power is also productive. Through the repression of certain political movements, projects or identities one makes likely other possibilities. If power is exercised carefully, it can create outcomes more to one’s liking. As such, I understand power to be a form of strategy, that is to say an attempt to constitute and ‘hegemonise’ a political space or community, altering its functioning and identity. On the level of substance, power also ‘fills’ things, much like a growing organism—it expands, thrusting back anything standing in its way. I suppose my conception of power is akin to Nietzsche’s:
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (—its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (‘union’) with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on.
On the end of superpowers and continental multipolarity, I really cannot agree with you. First, it would seem that you equate ‘superpower’ with ‘hegemon’, but I think this to be mistaken and restrictive. But in any case, this is beside the point. I have no real interest in getting bogged-down in banal debates on the ontology of superpowers—a term which is itself constructed. All I would say is that the United Provinces of the Netherlands or Spain under the Habsburgs were not ‘superpowers’ but probably exercised greater power and relative reach than even the Soviet Union or America during the latter stages of the Cold War.
Second, it does not matter if any one power actually has the economic, political, social and political power to become a ‘superpower’ or even a ‘hegemon’. Indeed, excluding perhaps the Nazis, no potentially hegemonic power appears to have started out with a grand plan to reorder the world, not least because it is often not possible to predict whether or not one has the ability to acquire primacy in the first place. Nobody foresaw the rise of the Dutch or British, and few the Americans or Russians.
What does matter, however, is that the nature of the international system requires all States to engage in the ‘will to power’; one cannot be secure without it. Power always seeks to fill relative vacuums and relative emptiness. This is why, even if a relatively stable balance of power predicated on continental giants emerged, the European Union must acquire the ability to resist the extension of the other powers’ power. Here, you might think that we have actually come to the same conclusion: So long as each continental giant can maintain the ‘will to power’ and resist the others’ pressure, a ’hyper multipolar’ world order will emerge, centred around a number of great powers/superpowers. This may even prevent them from exercising global power, leading to their concentration on their immediate neighbourhoods. But it would seem that such orders (the closest was probably in the early twentieth century after the breakdown of the British pax) do not last for very long, because it is not possible to maintain the status quo indefinitely.
If we look at the Dutch, British or American rise, it seems that their hegemony was not only a product of their ability to overpower relative vacuums, but also systemic change in the historical epoch. The Dutch rise was on the back of the Age of Reason (particularly banking and the end of feudalism), the British on the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution and the Americans on Modernity (e.g. electricity, production lines, computers, space technology and nuclear fission). Their development of advanced technologies and politico-economic techniques gave them the edge over their rivals, meaning the multipolar system was shaken down, and replaced with hegemony. Then everyone else caught up...and the process starts all over again.
So on the face of it, we probably are about to enter an era of continental multipolarity where no single great power/superpower can dominate. But I waiver that the first bloc (out of perhaps the European Union, United States, China and India, perhaps with Russia and Brazil tagging along somewhere behind) to gain the capacity to utilise new energy systems and manipulate ever greater concentrations of information—perhaps fusion power, nanotechnology, energy weapons and biological computers—will overthrow the emerging system and will be in a position to exercise global power again.
Still, this is a secondary consideration for Europeans at the moment. A multipolar world of great powers will be enough to render any single European Union Member State an insignificance. The European Union is still essential to prevent any of us becoming pawns in somebody else’s game of chess. Once (or if?) we have succeeded in making the Union equal to any potential rival, then we can think about what might come next.
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