Georgia: the next Yugoslavia?
Georgia, a small country on the eastern shores of the Black Sea, under the leadership of Mikhail Saakashvili’s relatively moderate, democratic and reformist—that is, pro-European, pro-American—government, was this morning violated by a Russian incursion into South Ossetia, a small province in northern Georgia. For anyone unaware of the history surrounding the conflict, the situation in South Ossetia has been rumbling on for years, often failing to attract much outside attention. South Ossetia unilaterally broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s, when the country gained its independence from Soviet Russia. The aims of the Russian leadership in South Ossetia, under the former communist and wrestler, Eduard Kokoiti, have always been reunification with the former imperial power on the other side of Georgia’s northern border. Up to ninety percent of South Ossetia’s population is Russian, and Moscow has entrenched these loyalties by stoking the flames of Russian nationalism in South Ossetia, not least by granting Russian passports to the vast majority of people in the territory. Russia has also improved the communications links between North Ossetia in Russia and South Ossetia in Georgia.
Worse, Russia has maintained a garrison in South Ossetia in a botched attempt to retain order in the territory after the breakup of the Soviet Union. But with the return of autocracy in Russia under Vladimir Putin’s regime, these Russian ‘peacekeeping’ forces have been used less for their original purpose, and more for Russian geopolitical designs in Georgia and the wider Caucasus. Like the situation in Moldova with Transnistria, South Ossetia has long been considered a ‘frozen conflict’ by European and American observers. But no conflict is ever truly frozen. Rather, while Russian troops and Georgian cautiousness have sought to keep a lid on the Ossetian cauldron, the Kremlin has been quietly encouraging Russian passport holders in South Ossetia to become more confident and pushy vis-à-vis the Georgian government in Tbilisi. Keeping Georgia divided and fragmented keeps it weak and down.
However, the Kremlin is not so much concerned with Georgia proper, but rather its authority in the Caucasus—particularly with regard to energy supplies. Georgia is the only viable corridor for the transit of energy from the Central Asian gas and oil fields to the European Union that excludes the energy passing through Russian territory. As Europeans have been increasingly keen to diversify their supplies since Russia shut off the gas supply to Ukraine in 2006, the Kremlin has tried to actively undermine their efforts. Preventing Georgia from becoming a fully coherent, affluent and stable democracy is part of that plan. The Russians calculate that European leaders will avoid building or extending new transit routes through conflict-ridden countries.
But Russian geostrategy is also motivated by wider concerns, which aim to re-establish Russian dominance across Eurasia. In the 1990s, this began with a statement by Anatoly Chubais, the privatisation minister in Boris Yeltsin’s government, that ‘liberal imperialism should become Russia’s ideology and building up a liberal empire Russia’s mission.’ This empire would include much of the former Russian empire and Soviet Union. In recent years, Vladimir Putin has lamented the defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of the Europeans and Americans in 1989 as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe’ of the twentieth century. And yesterday, the new Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, proclaimed that Russia was compelled to invade Georgia because ‘I must protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are’. Russia’s leaders seem progressively more convinced that they have the legitimacy and right to intervene militarily to protect Russian passport holders in countries on Russia’s borders. The old Roman dictum Civis Romanus Sum—I am a Roman citizen—springs to mind, albeit with ‘Russian’ replacing ‘Roman’.
As readers of my previous articles will know, I have long argued for a robust European approach towards Russia. Given that Russia rejected the olive branch offered by the West after the end of Soviet rule, it is time that the European Union stopped issuing silly ‘statements of grave concern’, and got involved directly and actively in conflicts on its borders, rolling back Russian influence as and when necessary. A European Union intervention force should have been readied and sent to Georgia long before this latest round of fighting broke out, as suggested by Estonia on Tuesday. After all, the European Security Strategy says that preventative engagement is always better than dealing with wars after they have begun. And that President Saakashvili has long requested the deployment of European peacekeeping forces to police his country’s unruly breakaway territories means that the legitimacy and international legality of such an intervention would not be in question. Should Russia respond, Europeans should not only demand that all Russian forces be removed from Georgia, but also remind Moscow that they reserve the right to be the ‘special authority’ in the European Neighbourhood. Indeed, a European ‘Monroe Doctrine’, directed primarily against Russia—but also brutality and wrongdoing on the part of others, like Georgia—in this zone should not be ruled out.
Georgia is not just a far-off country of which we know nothing, but is rather a nation of critical importance to Europeans and the European Union. We should not want it to become another Yugoslavia. Unless Europeans come to the aid of a beleaguered Georgia, Russia will reassert its power—which it is particularly keen to do after the humiliation it suffered over the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008. And if Russia prevails, it will calculate that Europeans will probably not intervene or get involved in future conflicts, such as those in Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia. After all, Russian passport holders exist in all of those countries too. This impacts on the cohesion of the European Union itself: if Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles see a failure on the Union’s part to prevent Russian geopolitical advances, why should they think that their fellow Europeans will come to their aid should Russian power be pressed in their direction?
[Update: 11th August 2008]
Selected articles:
• Svante Cornell, ‘The war that Russia wants’, The Guardian, 8th August 2008.
• Charles Crawford, ‘Georgia’s Not So Virtual Reality’, CharlesCrawford.biz, 9th August 2008.
• Edward Lucas, ‘How Georgia fell into its enemies’ trap’, The Times, 9th August 2008.
• Presidents of Poland and the Baltic States, ‘Joint Statement on the Georgia-Russia War’, Georgia Daily, 9th August 2008.
• The Professor, ‘More Russian delusions’, Streetwise Professor, 9th August 2008.
• Bronwen Maddox, ‘NATO should press on and give Georgia membership’, The Times, 10th August 2008.
• James Sherr, ‘Russia demands to be regarded as number one’, The Sunday Telegraph, 10th August 2008.
• Andrew Wilson, ‘War in Georgia—the EU needs to step in’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10th August 2008.
• David Clark, ‘The west can no longer stand idle while the Russian bully wreaks havoc’, The Guardian, 11th August 2008.
• Denis MacShane, ‘We must act to resist Russian aggression’, Daily Telegraph, 11th August 2008.
• Photo by Jonathan Alpeyrie. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 3.0 Licence.

9 comments:
It's become clear that Georgia is de facto in Russia's sphere of influence and that the EU has no military leverage in the area.
The reaction might have been different had the Russians moved first, but, as you neglect to mention, this started with a Georgian escalation (which included shelling a civilian population).
Why do you see everything on a slippery slope, or through the lens of Munich? We had a stable arrangement with the Soviets following Yalta that held for 45 years. After that, the 'west' pushed successfully east.
Now we've reached the limits, and need a more or less informal understanding again (which includes the neutrality of Ukraine, the possibility that Belarus is incorporated into Russia, whereas the Balkans and Turkey can be integrated into Europe).
Containment worked out well in the past. What reasons to you have for suggesting that we should switch to a position of aggression and total dominance vis a vis Russia? What means do you think we have or can reasonably develop?
Are there any countries without Russian passport holders?
Nanne: The reason Georgia is under attack by Russia is because Europeans have not been willing to deal with Russia as it should be dealt with—as a wild and unruly competitor. Here, Germany is mostly responsible, particularly its blocking of the granting of a Membership Action Plan to Georgia at Bucharest earlier in the year. I doubt Georgia would be suffering in the way that it now is had it been fully on the path to NATO membership. So there is no reason why Europeans should leave Georgia to be swallowed up by Russia.
Before you point to Georgia's 'escalation', you might care to remember that Russia has been taunting Georgia for many years, and has been bolstering its so called 'peacekeeping force' in South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) for the last few years. This force is not neutral and serves Russia's geopolitical interests. South Ossetia is part of Georgia. A democratic country must have full sovereignty over its geographical area. Russia has no right to intervene in the affairs of a foreign country, let alone a democracy.
We did not have a stable arrangement with the Soviet empire because of Yalta. Rather, we had a (relatively) stable arrangement because we maintained a strong military, backed up with a large nuclear arsenal. Further, we operated an aggressive strategy of containment vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, and from 1974 a more interventionist approach, with the US Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Helsinki Final Act.
It's pretty sad if you think we've reached our limits; this is just defeatism. The European Union's population is four times bigger than Russia's, and its economy is fifteen times larger. Our combined military spending is five times bigger, and our technology far in advance. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are European countries, and have the right to join the European Union and NATO. It is amoral and unacceptable that you should concede that Russia has the right to prevent sovereign countries from choosing their own destiny.
Containment was an aggressive strategy—too aggressive sometimes (e.g. Vietnam). But containment went hand-in-hand with far more interventionist approaches, which came into their own during fits and starts throughout the long years of the Cold War. First, the West tried to show that its system was superior to decadent communism (e.g. the Apollo Moon Landings and broadcasting of Western television and radio into the Soviet bloc). Second, a military strategy aiming to force the Soviets into a competition they could never win, due to the sheer industrial might of the Western democracies, to deplete and exhaust the Soviet economy. Third, with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which aimed to humiliate and hold to account the Soviet oppression of human rights, later buttressed by the third 'basket' of the Helsinki Final Act.
So 'containment' was not just a strategy of holding tight and erecting a cage around the Soviet Union. It involved far more aggressive activities, whose ultimate aim was to undermine and usurp the legitimacy and existence of the Soviet regime. We need a new strategy vis-à-vis Russia. We have the economic, political and military power to thoroughly contain and roll back Russian aggression, and ultimately put the country back in its box. The only thing lacking is the political will, and the understanding that we are not going to be friends with a large and aggressive country on our eastern flank.
The history of Russia—much like the history of Britain and France—has been one of almost relentless expansion. Old habits die hard. If Russia is not stopped in Georgia, make no mistake, Ukraine, Moldova and even further afield, will be next. The stronger we allow Russia to become, the weaker we become, and the less able and coherent the European Union will become. Unless you are a Russian, you should not want that.
Ralf: Exactly, on Medvedev's new rationale, where does the policy end? South Ossetia? Georgia? Ukraine? Moldova? Estonia? Latvia? Finland?! We must act now, so that we do not need to find out.
James,
We in NATO have a right to determine how far we want to stretch our alliance and whether we are willing to take up countries that have unresolved internal conflicts that can easily draw us into war with Russia. We also have a right to determine the extent of our charity in the EU in taking up countries that are extremely poor and whose democracies are still fledging.
I recommend that you look extremely close at the timeline of events. It clearly shows that Georgia opened a major offensive, and the Russians only invaded a good half day afterwards. Saakashvili has been aggressive towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia since he entered office. It's a complex situation insofar as there have been minor hostilities for a good while and it's difficult to say in such a case who started what, but the escalation clearly came from the side of Georgia.
We do not have the capability right now to deal with the Russians in Georgia. Europe only has the capability to send in about 4000-5000 troops on short notice, as the defence review by Nick Whitley for the ECFR shows.
(also see my post on the Atlantic Review on that)
If we'd want to defend Georgia, we would need to post a small army (40,000 troops or upwards) inside its territory, or in the far north-east of Turkey.
I maintain that we'll see what Russian intentions are over the following days. If they do not go beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I don't think that there is enough reason for Europe to take a more aggressive posture.
Nanne: You are to some extent correct that we (either the Union or NATO) have the right to refuse membership to countries which do not cut the mustard. But I think, as NATO continues its progression towards a two-tiered alliance, that some members have more of a right here than others. Given that only Britain and France now spend more than the two percent of their GDP on their armed forces (NATO's benchmark), along with the United States, these key powers should be granted a position of primus inter pairs to steer the alliance. I fear this is the only way to get countries like Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain (all spending well under the NATO benchmark) to awaken from their strategic slumbers and share the burden for the West's collective defence.
Until citizens in those countries assume their obligations and responsibilities, they have no right to tell the powers that are willing to make the sacrifice what to do. I refer here particularly to the recent rejection of the granting of MAP status to Georgia and Ukraine, which the United States was very keen on, but was scuttled by Berlin and Paris (with, unfortunately, support from London). However, I am led to believe that Paris and London were not opposed to the American proposals themselves, but rather preferred to stand by Germany in some form of tactical move (so as not to alienate Berlin).
Clearly, the Americans were right. Had Georgia been granted MAP status, the Russians would not have dared to intervene, for fear of NATO's wrath. Russia under the current leadership is particularly confident at the moment, and such arrogance can only be met with the same from ourselves.
I disagree with you on the issue of escalation. Or rather, I am happy to accept that Georgia took the first shot in the sense of starting a bombardment of South Ossetia. BUT: It is clear that Russia has been taunting the Georgians for a very long time, providing the Russians in South Ossetia with means and materiel to fight the Georgians. As Charles Crawford, formerly a British Ambassador, points out here with an amusing analogy, a country can only accept a pack of snappy dogs on its territory for so long, before needing to send in the police to round them up and impound them. And given that South Ossetia is in Georgia, Russia has no right to get involved.
But there again, as I tried to point out in my article, this is where the European Union should have been involved a long while ago. Rather than wasting armed forces on distant and intractable conflicts in Africa, we should have preventatively engaged in the South Ossetian and Akhbazian conflicts long ago. It would not take many troops to have installed some form of peacekeeping operation and long term mediation efforts had this been undertaken when first mooted, back in 2005. This is also the point made in Andrew Wilson's latest article for the European Council on Foreign Relations.
I've read Nick Witney's report, which compliments that of Daniel Keohane, for the Centre for European Reform, quite nicely. Although, I think Nick Witney may have been a little cautious in stating that that ‘Europe’ can dispatch only than 4000-5000 forces at short notice: Britain alone sent 45,000 to Iraq in a couple of months in 2003. In the Falklands War, it sent 27,000 in a couple of weeks. How short notice is ‘short notice’? I guess it depends on the severity of the situation.
By the way, I'm not stating we should get militarily involved to defend Georgia. That could soon spiral into a nuclear conflagration. But once the dust has settled, we need to re-assess our relationship with Russia—and there must be consequences for the Kremlin's bad behaviour.
Dear James,
I'm a British Council scholar from Georgia studying MBA at Lancaster University. I must say I have become a fan of yours just by reading this single article by yourself. Thank you very much for such an in-depth and well-thought analysis. I have taken a liberty to publish your article on my Facebook hoping that you would not be against it.
Furthermore, I would like to be your friend on Facebook. My profile ID is http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=651822924.
Best regards,
David Doborjginidze
Dear David,
Many thanks for your kind words. We must stand together in resisting Russian aggression and standing up for European interests. So I'm happy for you to use my brief article on your profile. I shall hopefully add something else as things play out.
James.
James,
You are right that the 4000-5000 number is not entirely accurate, that would be approximately the number of troops that are integrated into the EU's 'battlegroups'. Of course, there are troops beyond those which can also be deployed on short notice (within 4 to 5 days).
Still, we should not exaggerate the capacity for rapid deployment out of theatre, which is severely hampered by a lack of airlift capacities. An interesting fact to note here is that we have a leasing agreement for airlift... with Russia!
Other than that, I agree with Andrew Wilson that "even if we think an issue is peripheral, we should get involved early on, when conflict prevention is still possible."
Wow, a really good article. Before all these happened, I knew that Russia will once cause problems, but I didn't expect it this soon. And they will surely not stop there.
But I think that it's really dangerous that we depend on Russia's oil, gas etc, because it might stop us acting in the future, when they will come closer...
Oh, and I think that they will be the liberators, who save us from the West's capitalism and other evilnesses. Just like they liberated East-Europe after WW2. They did it so well that later these countries needed heavy sacrifices to get out from their influence...
Am I right if I think that just like in Romania and Bulgaria the name of the system changed, but communist leaders remained?
Oh, and the use of communist symbols should be banned just like the Nazi ones. Here, where I live, the Russian "liberators" caused bigger destructions than the Nazis! Incredible... (Well, the Nazis "only" wanted to destroy the Jews, but the communists wanted to destroy all. The Nazis brought some good things (German watches, etc), the Russians took all, even the spirit which contains methyl-alcohol and it's not suitable to be drank...).
P.S.: This doesn't means the Nazis were good. They were criminals. But I didn't find a better way to characterize what Russians are able to do. What will future hold for us? Let's hope it's not a Russian empire over Eurasia... In George Orwell's 1984 that's the second superpower...
P.S.2: Please forgive my horrible English, I'm Hungarian (as nationality, but living in Romania)
So, the article is great! And I love this blog (especially the title :D )
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