Why both Europeans and Americans need a strong Europe

A couple of years ago, while I was the Director of the European Union research programme at The Henry Jackson Society, I wrote an article arguing that it was imperative that the European Union should become a ‘global power’, so that Europeans have the means to defend and extend their interests and values in the modern world. Robert Kagan, now thought to be the leading foreign policy advisor to John McCain, the Republican presidential hopeful in the United States, now seems to agree. As he put it, in the International Herald Tribune, three days ago:

To Euro-enthusiasts across the Continent, the new constitution was the answer to Europe’s malaise and the next step toward global leadership. But what now, since the treaty is dead?

All of this is bad news for the United States. In a world of rising great powers, of which two happen to be autocracies, the United States needs its fellow democracies to be as strong as possible.

A unified, independent, capable Europe is in American interests, even if we may disagree at times. I would much rather see Europe run the 21st century than Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Hu Jintao’s China.

The danger of this latest blow to European confidence is that America’s allies, including Britain, could gradually sink into global irrelevance.

He ends his article with the paragraph:

And perhaps Europe—the Europe lacking in leadership, the Europe now lacking a new treaty—is the way it is because that’s what the people really do want. If so, the 21st century, decidedly not run by Europe, will be a very tricky time for the United States.

So far from celebrating the weakness of the Europeans as he came close to doing in his seminal book Paradise and Power, Kagan now urges Europeans to become stronger, more confident and more integrated. A weak Europe is not in our interest, the interest of the United States, or the spread of constitutional government and human rights in foreign countries.

So I thought I would reproduce my original article for The Henry Jackson Society here, if only to remind any anti-Europeans of the reasons for why they are wrong:

A ‘Global Power Europe’: Why we need it

24th August 2006

The world in the twenty-first century is changing fast. New challenges, perhaps even to the very existence of Europe and the rest of the civilised world continue to grow at an alarming rate. When our leaders warn of an ‘arc of extremism’, they are not indulging in windy rhetoric or trying to scare us. The threats that the European Union and its allies face are both very real and very dangerous. Only last week was a terrorist plot thwarted in the United Kingdom that threatened to inflict mass murder on a scale possibly exceeding that of 11th September 2001. But global terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremists is only one of a series of strategic and security challenges now facing Europe; indeed, it may be a less important one. An amalgamation of the European Union’s expansion into the continent’s peripheries, the emergence of new centres of power in the world, combined with the threat of foreign policy apprehensiveness and a failure to the ‘will to power’ by Europeans demands new and radical action. To address these problems, what is required is for Europeans to work relentlessly to forge the European Union into a first-rate global power that will provide the weight and influence with which to shape the global environment into one more conducive to their values and interests.

Resources aplenty…

It is often conventional wisdom to accept that Europe’s heyday has been and gone. This is an inaccuracy of considerable proportions. After all, the European Union’s twenty-five states, when combined, still have formidable material resources at their disposal. The Union’s population of almost half a billion people creates a gross domestic product, according to Eurostat, of over €10.8 trillion (in 2005) – approximately €800 billion more than the United States – meaning that the bloc has by far the world’s largest economic output. Rapid economic growth in both the new accession states, and in the more liberal economies like Britain’s, means that the European economy can only continue to expand. Further, many European cities are at the vortex of the globalising economy. London, for example, is indisputably the planet’s dominant ‘world city’, with more economic exchange, foreign banks and multinational companies’ headquarters than any other city. Indeed, both London and Paris’ economies generate in excess of €600 billion per year, meaning that each has a bigger economy than many of the world’s richest industrial countries. London’s economy, for example, is comparable to those of Belgium, Russia and Sweden. What’s more, recent research suggests that this lead continues to grow.

Europe’s ideological and cultural attraction is also vast. Home of the development of the Magna Carta, the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the Rights of Man, parliamentary democracy, modernity and the process of regional integration, the continent has long been at the vanguard of progress and human innovation. European countries exert an enormous pull on other parts of the world, undoubtedly because of their spreading of European culture over the past five-hundred years during the Age of Exploration. English is the planet’s lingua franca, and numerous other European languages, from French to Spanish, are spoken in many of the world’s nations. The dynamism seen within the European democracies, moreover, in cinematic production, music, drama and the arts, has a positive impact on the rest of the globe. And European democracies—especially the established ones, like the United Kingdom and France—are a beacon of freedom and a model of civilisation to the rest of the world. Europe’s model of regional integration, moreover, holds out the prospect of the abolition of conflict throughout the continents of the world, and the spreading of a durable peace, underpinned by common values and lapped in universal law.

European military might is also strong. The United Kingdom and France have, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the second and third largest defence budgets in the world. If taken as a whole, while the European Union’s states spend approximately €170 billion on their armed forces, which, although less than half of America’s spending, is still more than all Asia and fourteen times more than all the countries of Africa combined. European states are the only others, bar the United States, that field ‘power projection’ capacities, able to be dispatched to almost anywhere in the world at short notice. The Royal Navy and the Marine nationale, are the only other navies, except the United States Navy, that possess aircraft carrier battlefleets, and both the Royal Air Force and the Armée de l’Air could utterly overwhelm any conceivable opponent. These forces are deployed across almost all of the Earth’s continents, in many of the world’s trouble spots, from Iraq and Afghanistan, to Congo and Sierra Leone. What’s more, these capabilities are set to increase: Britain, France and Italy are all planning or building larger aircraft carriers, while a new generation of warships and missile-firing submarines will be operational within the next decade. Finally, the European Union is effectively a nuclear power, under the shield of Britain and France’s strategic missile umbrella.

…but is there the will to use them?

Make no mistake, the European Union has the potential to be a top global power. But while Europeans have such formidable assets at their disposal there is a strong reluctance to unify in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy, which is further augmented by displays of a certain timidity in some European states, which, consequentially, causes divergences with the duties and obligations that come with being a global power. If foreign countries, and especially autocratic regimes, do not respect, let alone fear, the Europeans, their international clout will not match their material assets and their adversities will be emboldened, damaging European interests all over the world. Europeans must gain the will to turn up in diplomatic forums and say, when necessary: “We are the European Union, and we are willing to make things very difficult for you if you refuse to comply with our wishes.” What is required, then, is ‘global power’ thinking: an understanding across the whole Union that the European Union is becoming—and must be—a global power. Europeans should, therefore, adopt the aura of power and the willingness to discharge it. This consists of three components: firstly, to use power comprehensively, including the threat of, and, when necessary, use of, military force. Secondly, to forge and adopt a ‘Grand Strategy’ outlining Europe’s role in the world and the threats and challenges confronting the bloc in the twenty-first century. Of course, this must be pliable if circumstances of world order change, but there must be some kind of framework put in place for action. Thirdly, European power must be used progressively as a force for good in the world; there must be no ‘managing’ of the status-quo, but rather, a transformational approach to shape the global environment to Europe’s advantage: in other words, the construction of security through the diffusion of democracy, solidarity and the rule of law in other countries. Finally, Europeans must wholly combine their resources, with the ultimate aim of creating a fully-fledged global power, with a single integrated foreign, security and defence strategy, as well as the centralised institutions, armed forces and civilian services to support that strategy.

Since the closing years of the previous decade, Europeans have realised that the collective weight of the European Union is, potentially, far in excess of any individual European state’s influence, including even Britain and France. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac, frustrated with Europe’s inability to deal collectively with security threats even on the bloc’s own doorstep—specifically in the former Yugoslavia—started the process of European military integration at St. Malo in 1998. Since then, integration in the area of European foreign, security and defence strategy has evolved rapidly. The Laeken Declaration of 2001 asserted that the European Union must become a power rather than a player or actor, implying the need of military assets instead of purely civilian ones. The Constitutional Treaty, which is now dormant after the non and nee it received in referendums in France and the Netherlands, contained a ‘solidarity clause’ in the event of an attack on any European state (similar to NATO’s Article 5), and the European Security Strategy, adopted by the Brussels European Council of December 2003, sought to establish a shared understanding of the threats to European security. The fact that the strategy was a short, well-written, and precise document, crafted by Javier Solana, the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Policy (and formerly Secretary-General of NATO) and a team of strategists, including Robert Cooper, the Union’s Director-General for Politico-Military Affairs (and previously a key advisor to the British Premier, Tony Blair) meant that it had a lot of extra resonance. But above all, the aim of the European Security Strategy was to shape common European threat perceptions and encourage the Union’s states to work collectively in foreign, security and defence strategy. Another aim was to show Washington that the Europeans were serious about security and defence in the wake of the transatlantic fall-out over Iraq.

What threats and challenges face Europe?

The European Security Strategy pointed to five key threats confronting Europe in the early years of the twenty-first century:

• Terrorism, especially by Islamist extremists
• The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
• Regional conflicts, specifically in Europe’s neighbourhood, but also further a field
• State failure and bad governance
• Organised crime, like illegal drugs-trading and gun-running

The strategy also pointed to the problem of global warming and environmental change, as well as the role of globalisation in compressing space and time, leading to the likelihood of insecurity transcending state borders. Further, it linked the threats together, stating that many were mutually dependent. And yet, there was little acknowledgement of ‘threat depth’, meaning the level at which a challenge or threat originates. If one threat were dependent on the existence of another, it would be logical to target the deeper problem. For example, one cannot address the threat from weapons of mass destruction or Islamist extremists without tackling the structures in ineffectively governed states overseas that create them. Unfortunately, since 11th September 2001, there has been a tendency to elevate the challenge of global terrorism, when this is merely a symptom of a deeper set of problems, namely failed and ineffectively governed states. The strategy did, however, assert that ‘the first line of defence will often be abroad’, and called for a more preventative approach to European security and defence policy – yet more joined-up and comprehensive strategic thinking is still required.

At the same time, there has been a certain mismatch between European states in their pursuit of foreign, security and defence strategy. Iraq is of course a major example; Afghanistan, to a lesser extent, another. Whereas the British have been heavily active throughout the world in the past few years, France and Germany have not. In part, this is a consequence of structural factors: Germany has limited armed forces and an insufficient defence budget, which amounts to a paltry one and a half percent of its gross national product, whereas France has experienced economic and social difficulties in recent years. But also important is ‘global power’ thinking. Whereas Britain’s approach is more values-driven, assertive and confident, France and Germany appear to prefer a more ‘amoral-quietist’ approach to foreign affairs, which is compounded by a creeping and self-referential anti-Americanism.

Yet Gerhard Schröder’s trouncing in Germany’s federal elections in 2005 and the election of Angela Merkel as Chancellor seems to have put some oomph into German activities on the world stage. For example, Germany agreed to lead the European Union’s recent military operation in the Congo, which aimed to retain order and the rule of law during that nascent democracy’s elections. The Congo was explicitly outlined as an area requiring special European-level attention in the European Security Strategy, and German participation, let alone leadership, in the operation—from a country with little overseas military experience—is perhaps a testament to the strategy’s influence and success. As Europe’s prevailing strategic-military power, Britain has a special role to play in the development of European ‘global power’ thinking. Firstly, it must try and sweep away old-fashioned foreign policy thinking in other European states. Secondly, and more importantly, it should also seek to spread its progressive ‘global power’ approach to foreign, security and defence policy throughout the rest of Europe, diffusing it, above all, in Brussels.

‘Global power’ thinking by the European Union is essential for the protection of the bloc’s interests in a twenty-first century where large new competitors and potential adversities are rising simultaneously in several areas of the globe. China’s ascent is well acknowledged. India too is emerging as a major actor. America’s strength will also likely expand further still, especially if the country’s population grows, as projected, to perhaps as much as four-hundred-and-fifty million in the next five decades. But America is no threat to Europe, and nor is India, at least in a strategic sense. Both are economic competitors, undoubtedly, but democratic friends all the same. China’s rise, however, is more disturbing, as would be a potential resurgence of Russia or a more assertive Iran.

A major military threat from China to Europe and its allies’ existence is implausible, but Chinese economic competition could become a serious concern. A more severe threat from China will likely be its influence in other countries. China’s insatiable demand for energy and raw materials means, unlike the Western democracies, that it is more than willing to support and trade with unpalatable regimes, like Zimbabwe and the Sudan. Consider this statement, made by an academic at Wits University in South Africa: ‘If we deal with the United States or West European governments they would bring a list of thirty-three items requiring restructuring of your democracy, your human rights issues…China would arrive and say we accept you as you are. And that’s a refreshing change.’ Here, some might suggest that Europeans should operate similarly to the Chinese, doing deals with any dictator willing, but this must be resisted. After all, the supporting of strongmen leads to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, as witnessed in the Middle East. Rather, the Europeans and Americans must redouble their efforts to push for more democratic reform, and there must be consequences for those who attempt to interfere. And to states that seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons—like Iran—the response must be firm: no more autocracies can be allowed nuclear weapons, and any who try shall be stopped using all necessary means.

The need for a ‘Grand Strategy’

The twenty-first century world, then, is likely to be just as problematic as the world in the previous century. If Europe’s interests are to be upheld, how should it proceed with the development of the necessary strategic doctrine, institutional apparatus and instruments of influence? Self-evidently, the governments of the twenty-five European states must give up more power and build new and dynamic central institutions in Brussels. In this regard, a European Union ‘Ministry of External Affairs’ ought to be created and installed without delay. This should include three branches, headed by a European Union Minister for External Affairs, who in turn would advise the European Council, European Parliament and European Commission. The first branch would be a ‘European Security Council’, comprised of practitioners, military officials and academic historians, geographers and, crucially, grand strategists. The Security Council’s role would be to identify the strategic challenges and the more immediate threats to Europe’s security, while recommending the necessary course of remedial action. The second part of the Ministry would include a ‘European Defence Board’, whose responsibility would be to co-ordinate European armed forces and civilian personnel and the acquisition of military weaponry and other equipment, as well as the running of overseas operations. The Ministry of External Affairs’ third branch would be a Diplomatic Service, whose aim would be to take-over the role from the member-states of representing the European Union and its interests abroad. It is essential, however, in the interests of holism that the Ministry’s direction comes from the ‘Security Council’ and that the defence and diplomatic branches are coordinated under its direction. The Ministry’s role would be a combined department for foreign, security and defence policy and each area requires to be fully integrated. The Ministry’s ultimate role would be to implement a ‘Grand Strategy’ for the European Union, which would be crafted by the ‘Security Council’, outlining the bloc’s interests, policies and role in the wider world in the short, medium and longer-terms.

But what would a European Union ‘Grand Strategy’ include? Without a systematic study, conducted by the ‘European Security Council’, such a question is difficult to answer. Yet some themes might be readily identified for inclusion:

Firstly, and most importantly, would be values, which pave the way for interests. The promotion of European values—such as democracy, social solidarity, and strict adherence to the rule of law—must be at the heart of any ‘Grand Strategy’. The European Union is not a traditional Great Power, as it is founded on values and the desire for a durable peace between ancient nations. To give up those ideals would be to surrender the very premise that the Union is based upon, reducing its moral and ideational legitimacy. In other words, Europe’s internal practices must be reflected in the way that it conducts itself abroad. But this does not mean that the Union should treat every external actor similarly. No indeed, a great deal of the world beyond Europe is very much unlike the Union. Many parts are like a jungle, and, as one of Europe’s leading grand strategists says, ‘when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.’ In other words, Europeans must be prepared to get tough when the situation demands. And, as a global power with truly worldwide interests, as well as a missionary agenda to promote the values on which it is founded, the European Union will likely need to discharge its power quite frequently. Let us be clear: this does not contradict European values, for even within Europe’s domestic sphere, there is a policeman waiting behind every constitution in every democracy ready to use force to uphold the rule of law. If it acceptable to use force to uphold the law domestically, then the use of force externally, especially if it builds a better, more just, and peaceful world, cannot but also be sanctioned.

Secondly, and obviously, a ‘Grand Strategy’ must identify longer-term challenges and immediate threats to Europe’s security. Here, the European Security Strategy is a strong and steady start. It—or an updated version—can be incorporated into the ‘Grand Strategy’. What is essential, however, is to really look into the future and make projections for circumstances that may not be readily visible today. Had strategists foreseen the atrocities on 11th September 2001, the root causes in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East might have been addressed long ago. Other longer-term challenges might include environmental breakdown and energy dependence, a failure to invest in the palliatives needed to reduce global warming, the installation of weaponry in space by rival powers, or the mass-sabotage of information networks by viruses or computer hackers.

Thirdly, it is evident that Europeans attach a considerable importance to multilateralism and institutions that seek to bind the world together and address problems collectively. While it is often more efficient to work with other countries and institutions, Europeans must realise that there is frequently a marked difference between those institutions comprised only of democracies and those including also autocracies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, for example, are institutions including only democracies, whereas the United Nations is an institution with all manner of states, from mature democracies like the United Kingdom and Switzerland, to repressive states like Iran and Libya. That countries like Iraq could sit on the United Nations’ Disarmament Committee and Libya on the Human Rights Committee is undesirable for obvious reasons. Autocracies are the natural adversities of democracies, so the European Union has to treat them differently to democratic partners, and those institutions comprised only of democracies must, therefore, be elevated above those that do not. Here, the European Union might consider giving the global movement to create a Community of Democracies far more consideration and support.

Fourthly, a ‘Grand Strategy’ must also address the instruments needed for Europe to act in the wider world, both for now and for in the future. That a combination of military and civilian tools are crucial, is beyond dispute, but in what quantity and what order? The European Union may need to build up a large and efficient civilian service—of policemen, doctors, judicial executives, democracy monitors and human rights officials—to complement its military forces. The armed forces would need to be maintained as a technologically powerful force, meaning that military research and development would be essential to retain technological superiority over all plausible rivals. The ‘Grand Strategy’ would need, furthermore, to identify the level of spending required for external action, such as budgets for aid, the armed forces and civilian services. Without sufficient funding, overseas action will not reach its full potential.

Europe: from a peace project to a ‘global power’

Europeans have now a unique opportunity to reinforce their position as one of the world’s most dynamic and influential powers. The strengthening of the European Union with the full range of instruments, central institutions and strategic doctrine is essential for their acting in the wider world. In an era of deteriorating security in many of the planet’s regions and the emergence of new centres of power on many of the world’s continents, the Europeans’ failure to grasp the nettle and assume the position as a top global power will see their interests and values simultaneously undermined worldwide. Not only will this be to the detriment of their own global standing and ability to influence other societies, but would also likely reduce the positive impact elsewhere of one of history’s greatest pioneers of innovation. Further, global powers have special obligations and duties to discharge in the wider world, and are expected by their weaker partners to act as forces not only of international stability and security, but also as leaders on the global stage. Europeans must make their continental union a force for good in the world, and help to build and lead the world in the twenty-first century. This will be the result of a strong and confident European Union, a ‘global power’ Europe.